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THE INVISIBLE HAND OF FAMILY: DIVERSIFICATION 




Business groups, the leading economic players in emerging economies, have 
adopted diversification as an important strategy to sustain and grow. While family 
influence has been central to the functioning of business groups in emerging economies, 
little is known about their effects on the diversification decisions. The principal objective 
of this dissertation is to further our understanding regarding 1) the influence of the 
‘invisible hand of family’ on the diversification decisions and 2) the consequent 
performance implications in business groups in emerging economies. 
Drawing on the literature of social embeddedness and diversification, I conceive 
diversification decisions in business groups as controlling owners’ responses to conform 
to familial norms and pursue family interests. When controlling owners are highly 
embedded in the family, they will perceive the family welfare as their priority and tend to 
serve the familial norms such as inheritance, conflict avoidance, legacy preservation and 
nepotism. These familial considerations will motivate controlling owners of business 
groups to diversify more, and to diversify via a new firm rather than a new division. 
Furthermore, I propose and demonstrate that such relationships are contingent on the 




In addition, prior research has emphasized the role of business group diversification 
as a substitute of the inefficient market intermediation in emerging economies. The 
performance implication of group diversification, however, has remained unclear. By 
considering both the costs and the benefits of group diversification, I demonstrate that 
group performance initially declines with the level of group diversification, and 
subsequently increases if group diversification exceeds a certain threshold. Moreover, I 
find that business groups gain better performance when using the new division approach 
than the new firm approach. However, the new division approach is not necessarily a 
preferable option for controlling owners whose primary interest is to serve their family 
welfare. 
I test these hypotheses with 101 business groups in Taiwan from year 1980 to 2000. 
This study helps to reconcile different predictions about the role of family in 
organizational strategies. The findings have implications for research on business groups, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Business groups, generally defined as a collection of legally independent firms 
bound together through persistent formal (e.g. equity) and informal (e.g. family) ties 
(Granovetter, 1995), dominate emerging economies around the world. One of the most 
notable strategies pursued by business groups is diversification (Chang, 2006; Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007). Prior studies have explained the antecedents of group diversifications from 
the market imperfection perspective (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 
1999a), the government intervention perspective (Carney, 2008) and the resource-based 
view (Guillen, 2000; Kock & Guillén, 2001). While these approaches have significantly 
contributed to our understanding of the development of business groups, researchers 
know ‘very little on the extent to which considerations affecting family firms influence 
the growth and behavior of business groups’ (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). This thesis 
attempts to contribute to the literature by investigating how the ‘invisible hand of family’ 
influences business groups’ diversification decisions as well as group performance. 
Family involvement through ownership and control pervades business groups in 
emerging economies and plays a central role in shaping various strategic decisions 
(Bertrand et al., 2008; Luo & Chung, 2005; Morck & Yeung, 2004). According to the 
family business literature, organizations with dominant family ownership and control will 
have different priority and agenda compared to the public-owned organizations. 
Controlling owners are more likely to serve their family interests, such as the 
maximization of socioemotional wealth, in the course of strategic decision makings 
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(Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). However, the impact of such 
non-economic family considerations on controlling owners’ diversification decisions 
remains ambiguous. Some scholars argue that controlling owners subject to family 
influence are risk averse and tend to diversify to reduce overall performance variance 
(Kim et al., 2004; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010). Others propose that 
controlling owners can be risk bearing to avoid family control loss, and will prefer the 
risk of high financial wealth concentration over that of diversification (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2010; Jones et al., 2008). 
One explanation for the seemingly opposing arguments is the assumption of 
homogeneity across organizations with family involvement. Prior research tends to study 
family businesses by comparing them to other non-family businesses, and proposes it is 
the family involvement through ownership and control that leads to the pursuit of 
non-economic family interests. Although this approach helps identify characteristics that 
are unique to family businesses (Bertrand et al., 2008), it may have overlooked the 
variations across organizations with different levels of family involvement. Controlling 
owners’ propensity to serve family interests can differ substantially among business 
groups with similar ownership and control characteristics. It is difficult to fully 
understand controlling owners’ motivations to diversify without examining the familial 
norms that informally binds the business group together and shapes controlling owners’ 
embeddedness in the family as an institution. 
Another important reason for the ambiguous finding is that existing studies tend to 
treat controlling owners’ embeddedness in family as a homogenous category. For 
instance, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) consider ‘the family, or the kinship group’ as a 
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common mechanism through which ‘social relationships are institutionalized’ and the 
principle of solidarity is generated. Although such treatment draws attention to the 
general significance of the family influence, studies drawing on the embeddedness 
perspective suggest that different types of embeddedness have different implications on 
organizational strategies (e.g. Chung & Luo, 2008a). Treating family characteristics as 
one single category may suppress the distinct effects of different types of embeddedness, 
making it difficult to assess their individual impacts on diversification decisions.  
This dissertation is undertaken to advance the understanding on how the ‘invisible 
hand of the family’ influences the diversification decisions and consequently the 
performance in business groups in emerging economies. It contributes to the 
understanding of business groups’ emergence and expansion, and the debate regarding 
family influence on organizational performance. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
The significance of business groups to the world economy, the conflicting findings 
on the diversification propensity in business groups with family involvement, together 
with the lack of attention to the heterogeneity across family businesses raise several 
intriguing and important questions. How does controlling owners’ family influence the 
level of diversification in business groups in emerging economies? What is the 
diversification approach that controlling owners in business groups will adopt and why? 
Under what conditions will the controlling owners prefer to diversify through new firms? 
What are the performance implications of controlling owners’ diversification decisions 




Given the inter-disciplinary approach, this thesis contributes to the literature on 
business group, diversification, family business and emerging economies. First, in the 
business group literature, the emergence and the development of business groups have 
been a core research question. Previous studies that draw on the perspectives of market 
inefficiency and government intervention tend to take a static approach and overlook the 
heterogeneity of business groups. In this study, I demonstrate how business groups 
evolve via diversifications, typically via new firms. By doing so, I attempt to address the 
limitations and shed light on the role of family in business groups’ strategic decisions. In 
addition, instead of emphasizing the benefits of the internal market in business groups, I 
highlight the costs of establishing it. By jointly investigating the costs and the benefits of 
diversification, I manifest when and why diversifications in business groups improve 
performance.  
Second, the diversification literature commonly proposes an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the extent of diversification and the organizational performance in 
the context of developed economies. In contrast, I focus on the emerging economies and 
demonstrate that the level of diversification has a U-relationship with group performance. 
Moreover, previous research on the mode of diversification tends to draw on the 
resource-based view and the transaction cost theory, yet these arguments have received 
inadequate empirical supports. In this study, I propose an alternative explanation for the 
decision of diversification mode: controlling owners’ incentives to conform to 
institutional norms. Additionally, while the previous focus of diversification mode lies on 
the choice between acquisition and greenfield, this study analyzes the diversification 
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mode between new firm and new division. I propose that the new firm approach is 
adopted by controlling owners to obtain control and manipulate resource distribution for 
the family interests.  
Third, the central debate in the family business literature is the family impact on 
organizational performance. Some scholars argue that family involvement deteriorates 
performance in family businesses (Becker, 1981; Schulze et al., 2001), whereas others 
argue for the opposite (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2005). In this dissertation, I advance the understanding of the invisible hand of family by 
demonstrating that controlling owners’ propensity to pursue family interests depends on 
their level of social and cognitive embeddedness in the family institution. This study is 
among the first to reconcile previous ambiguous findings on diversification strategies in 
family businesses. Also, the findings of this study suggest that controlling owners’ 
self-interest can be multi-dimensional. Their motives to diversify are contingent on their 
level of embeddedness in different institutions.   
Fourth, this study focuses on business groups, a prevalent organizational form in 
emerging economies. The findings on the robust impact of family value in business group 
management differs from the common practices in the Western developed economies. As 
a result, it provides some practical implications for Western organizations that enter and 
compete in the fast-growing emerging economies. 
 
1.4 Outline 
I organize my dissertation as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on relevant 
topics, such as diversification in business groups in emerging economies, family 
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involvement and diversification decision, familial norms in family businesses, 
institutional embeddedness perspective and diversification-performance relationship.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effects of family embeddedness on controlling 
owners’ diversification decisions. I propose that controlling owners’ decision preference 
is determined by their level of embeddedness in family. In particular, controlling owners 
are likely to pursue a higher level of diversification when they have higher social 
embeddedness (measured by family size) or higher cognitive embeddedness (measured by 
generation and foreign education) in family. Also, I propose that controlling owners are 
more likely to pursue diversification through a new firm rather than a new division if they 
have higher social or cognitive embeddedness in family institution. 
Chapter 4 identifies two contingencies of controlling owners’ diversification 
decisions in business groups: control concentration and institutional development. I 
propose that the level of control concentration should not be considered as a proxy for 
controlling owners’ agency behavior. Instead, the level of control concentration plays a 
facilitating role in aligning controlling owners’ primary social interests with their 
diversification decisions. Furthermore, I posit that the effect of family embeddedness on 
controlling owners’ diversification decisions is moderated by the degree of institutional 
development. As institution develops, the increasing presence of foreign companies and 
the conflicting ideologies between East and West will mitigate the family influence on 
strategic management and thus the relation between family embeddedness and 
diversifications decisions.  
Chapter 5 discusses the performance implication of controlling owners’ 
diversification decisions in business groups. Previous studies have generally applied the 
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context of developed countries and concluded an inverted-U relationship between the 
level of diversification and the organizational performance (Gary, 2005; Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1990; Montgomery, 1994; Palich et al., 2000). Because of the institutional 
differences between developed and emerging economies, however, such finding may not 
be generalizable in emerging economies. Alternatively, I propose that business groups 
will incur substantial costs at the initial stage of diversification, especially the costs of 
establishing the internal market. The benefits from the economy of scale and scope, 
however, will gradually offset the costs, leading to a U-relation between the level of 
diversification and business group performance. Moreover, I examine how the mode of 
diversification influences performance. I hypothesize that business groups will have 
better performance when they use the new division approach to pursue related 
diversifications or the new firm approach to pursue unrelated diversification.  
Chapter 6 introduces the empirical context of this dissertation: Taiwanese business 
groups from 1980 to 2000. I explain why Taiwanese business group is an ideal context 
for the purpose of this study. Meanwhile, I offer a brief description of Taiwanese 
business groups during the past decades. The diversification by Taiwanese business 
groups serves as an engine for the expansion of the group business and the development 
of Tanwan’s economy.  
Chapter 7 presents the research design and methods used to test the hypotheses in 
Chapter 3 to 5. The first half of the chapter provides detailed information on all 
dependent variables, independent variables and control variables. The second half 
describes the modeling procedures, including Poisson model regression to predict the 
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level of diversification, Logit model regression to predict the mode of diversification, and 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model regression to predict group performance. 
Chapter 8 reports the empirical findings of controlling owners’ family 
embeddedness and their diversification decisions in Taiwanese business groups. I start 
with the descriptive analysis of the longitudinal data, and then move on to the empirical 
findings of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. I close the chapter with a set of 
robustness checks to test for the sensitivity of the results. 
Chapter 9 presents the contingent effect in the relationship between controlling 
owners’ family embeddedness and their diversification decisions. In general, the 
proposed contingent effects of control concentratin and institutional development have 
received empirical supports. 
Chapter 10 utilizes a structure parallel to that of Chapter 8 and 9. I present the 
pattern of the performance of Taiwanese business groups. As proposed in Chapter 5, the 
result reveals a curvilinear relationship between the level of diversification and the 
business group performance. The proposition that business groups perform better when 
related diversifications are pursued through a new division has received empirical 
support. 
Chapter 11 summarizes the main findings and discusses the implications to strategy 
literature. I elaborate how the findings in this dissertation contribute to the literature of 
business group, diversification, family business and emerging economies. I conclude the 
section by discussing the limitations of this study and the directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Diversification in Business Groups in Emerging Economies 
Business group, conventionally defined as a collection of legally independent firms 
bound together by persistent formal and/or informal ties (Granovetter, 1995), is a 
prevalent organizational form that has significant economic impact on the world 
economy in general, and the emerging countries in particular. In their study on business 
groups in nine emerging countries around the world (India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey), Khanna and Yafeh (2005) find 
that the fraction of companies affiliated to business groups ranges from about one-fifth in 
Chile to about two-thirds in Indonesia. Moreover, the group-affiliated companies 
outperform the other independent companies in general. Consistently, Chang (2006) 
demonstrates that business groups are of particular importance to East Asian countries.  
One of the most distinctive characteristics shared across business groups in 
emerging economies is diversification (Chang, 2006). Khanna and Yafeh (2007) 
document that business groups in Chile, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines and 
Thailand generally operate in more than two 2-digit industries. Prior literature has 
discussed extensively the antecedents of business groups’ diversification decision. 
Overall, the argument can be summarized into three broad categories: the market 
imperfection perspective, the government intervention perspective and the resource-based 
view. 
The market imperfection perspective views diversification in business groups as a 
response to institutional voids. According to Leff (1978: 666), business groups arise with 
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‘the absence of markets for risk and uncertainty’. Market imperfection makes it costly to 
acquire necessary resources, establish brand image and form external partnership. The 
structure of business groups replicates the functions provided by the advanced institutions, 
and serves as a substitute of the inefficient institution and a remedy of the market failure. 
The power and the scale of business groups allow them privileged access to resources and 
talents (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 1999a; Li et al., 2006). Business groups can also 
leverage the reputation in their core business to obtain credibility and legitimacy in the 
diversifying entrants (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 2000b). Accordingly, business groups can 
create value by internalizing a variety of transactions, and a company may be more 
profitable when affiliated with a business group. Evidence from business groups in 
emerging countries such as South Korea and India has corroborated with this line of 
argument (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
The government intervention perspective considers government support as a major 
driving force for the diversification in business groups. Carney (2008: 599) argues that 
business groups ‘appeared and prospered because states actively and passively annulled, 
dismantled, and generally rescinded the operation of market institution’. The group 
formation and continuous growth is therefore attributed to ‘a series of single party states 
and/or strongmen leaders with long, uninterrupted periods in power (who) have directly 
constructed or encouraged the development of large diversified business groups to pursue 
nationalist political and economic agendas’. A typical example of business groups as 
such is the Japanese prewar business group (zaibatsu), which emerges as a result of 
government privatization and is described as administered capitalism by Lincoln and 
Gerlach (2004). The emergence of business groups in Indonesia (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), 
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Israel (Maman, 2002), Malaysia (Gomez & Jomo, 1999) and South Korea (Chang, 2003) 
has also been dramatically influenced by government policies. More recently, scholars 
have documented that the formation process of business groups in China (Keister, 2000) 
and Russia (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005) is under the protection and support of the 
government. 
The resource-based view of business groups proposes that business groups diversify 
when they possess capability to combine valuable domestic and foreign resources to enter 
new industries quickly and cost-effectively (Guillen, 2000). Instead of considering 
business groups as substitutes for market imperfections, scholars drawing on the 
resource-based view consider business groups as an organizational form that competes 
against foreign MNE subsidiaries and domestic independent firms (Guillen, 2000; Kock 
& Guillén, 2001). Business groups will pursue more unrelated diversification when they 
are able to acquire resources in an environment with restricted foreign investment. The 
diversification process in business groups is thus viewed as ‘a logical extension of a 
sequence of core capabilities’ (Kock & Guillén, 2001: 85).  
Although the market imperfection perspective, the government intervention 
perspective and the resource-based view have significantly advanced our understanding 
of the antecedents of business groups’ diversifications, there are some limitations in these 
approaches that warrant a more careful investigation.  
First, the market imperfection perspective and the government intervention 
perspective tend to focus on the external determinants and assume homogeneity across 
business groups. These two approaches fail to fully capture the underlying mechanisms 
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within business groups that lead to the variations in diversification strategies and the 
subsequent performance across business groups.  
Second, the market imperfection perspective and the government intervention 
perspective generally adopt a static approach that renders it difficult to explain why and 
how business groups persist overtime. Based on the market imperfection perspective, 
business groups will lose their competitive advantages and will encounter pressures to 
restructure or dissolve away with the gradual improvement of market institutions (Carney, 
2008). However, this logic seems to be contradictory to the longevity and continuous 
expansion of certain business groups in both developed and developing economies 
(Chang et al., 2006; Smångs, 2008). According to Granovetter (2005), business groups’ 
survival from the impacts of economic crises has defied the traditional predictions of 
their imminent demise. Similarly, although the government intervention perspective has 
addressed the driving force of group formation, it does not fully address business groups’ 
continuous process of capability development and diversifications at the later stage.  
Third, studies adopting the resource-based view are mostly based on case analyses 
and are subject to the limitations of small sample size (Arregle et al., 2007; Kock & 
Guillén, 2001; Lechner & Leyronas, 2009). More importantly, the current discussion 
tends to focus on resources such as reputation and intra-group network (Chung, 2006; 
Lechner & Leyronas, 2009), yet has overlooked the influence of a social relationship that 
is commonly resided in business groups in emerging economies: family relation. Family 
relationship has been considered as an important resource that generates solidarity 
(Granovetter, 1994) and governs the group behaviors with ‘norms that have little to do 
with economic costs and benefits’ (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b: 271). However, we know 
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little on the extent to which such non-economic familial goals affect the diversification 
decisions in business groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). I will review the existing studies 
on family businesses in emerging economies, particularly the family influence on 
diversification decisions, in the next section. 
 
2.2 Family Involvement and Diversification Decision 
Family involvement is prevalent in organizations around the world. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) conduct a systematic investigation on the 
ownership structures of large corporations in 27 countries. They conclude that large 
corporations, especially those in countries with weak legal and regulatory protection for 
public shareholders, are predominantly controlled by wealthy families. This finding is 
corroborated by subsequent studies. For example, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) 
show that more than half of the 2980 East Asian companies in their sample are 
extensively controlled by family. Faccio and Lang (2002) find family involvement in 
about 44 percent of a sample of 5232 corporations from 13 Western European countries. 
Morck and Yeung (2004) further demonstrate family business as a ubiquitous 
organizational form in the U.S. and countries throughout the world. 
Organizations with predominant family involvement are usually referred to as 
family businesses. Following the previous literature, family business is defined as a 
business where ‘its ownership and management are concentrated within a family unit, 
and to the extent its members strive to achieve and/or maintain intra-organizational 
family-based relatedness’ (Sharma & Kesner, 1996: 185). Family businesses have been 
documented to bear different priority and agenda compared to the public-owned 
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organizations. Controlling owners are likely to predominantly serve the family interests 
during their strategic decision makings. By being generous to their family members and 
encouraging them to care about each other, controlling owners in family businesses are 
able to foster strong bonding among family members. The strong bonding will generate 
loyalty and commitment among family members, and eventually benefit the long-term 
prosperity of the family businesses (Schulze et al., 2001). Scholars have referred to such 
non-economic self-interest as altruism and have defined it as a trait that connects the 
welfare of an individual to that of the others (Becker, 1981; Schulze et al., 2001).  
The most documented approach to maximize the family welfare is perhaps the use 
of pyramidal structure (La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). According to La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), pyramidal structure is a structure in which a family 
firm controls several companies, each of which controls yet more companies, and so on. 
The control pyramidal structure creates deviation between controlling family’s voting 
rights and cash flow rights. As a result, the controlling family is able to control a large 
number of companies with relatively limited investment. 
Previous studies on the antecedents of diversification have generally applied 
public-owned organizations in the Western countries as the empirical background 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Denis et al., 1997; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). However, little is 
known on how family involvement affects diversification decisions and the consequent 
performance implications. Even among the limited number of studies that examine 
diversification strategies in family businesses, results have been largely inconsistent 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010). 
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On the one hand, some scholars argue that family businesses are more likely to 
diversify. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) posit that the controlling owners in family business 
can be risk averse and may pursue diversification, particularly unrelated diversification, 
to reduce idiosyncratic risks. Kim, Kandemir and Cavusgil (2004) argue that 
diversification in family business is a response to inefficient institution. Zheng (2002) 
and Miller, Le Breton-Miller and Lester (2010) consider diversification as a viable 
approach to maintain family control and family wealth from generation to generation.  
On the other hand, other scholars have shown the opposite. For example, drawing 
on 318 S&P 500 Industrial firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) show that family 
businesses pursue less diversification than non-family businesses, and family holdings 
are not limited to low-risk industries. Following studies corroborate this finding with 
certain modifications. Jones, Makri and Gomez-Mejia (2008) propose that family 
businesses prefer lower levels of diversification as a means to protect their 
socioemotional wealth, yet the presence of affiliate directors can reduce the perceived 
risks associated with diversification. Gomez-Mejia, Makri and Kintana (2010) further 
demonstrate that family businesses diversify less than non-family businesses in general, 
but family businesses are more willing to diversify as business risk increases.  
The above inconclusive findings require a more careful investigation on the 
mechanism through which organizations with family involvement pursue diversification 
strategies. One similarity among the above studies is the tendency to compare family 
businesses with non-family businesses. These studies generally assume that family 
involvement through ownership and control leads to the pursuit of family interests and 
non-economic family welfare. Although this approach has significant contributions to the 
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current literature, the underlying assumption of homogeneity across family businesses 
runs the risk of overlooking the fact that controlling owners’ propensity to serve family 
interests can also differ substantially among organizations with similar ownership and 
control characteristics. It is hard to fully capture controlling owners’ motivations to 
diversify without examining the familial norms that informally binds the group together 
and shapes controlling owners’ behavioral preference. In the next section, I will 
summarize the existing discussions on familial norms in family businesses. 
 
2.3 Familial Norms in Family Businesses  
The family involvement, which usually takes place through family ownership 
and/or family management (La Porta et al., 1999), implants familial norms in the 
organization and influences controlling owners’ decision process. Prior literature has 
documented three key familial norms that are commonly observed in the family business.  
First, the rule of inheritance is generally considered as one of the most important 
norms that govern family businesses (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). The inheritance norm 
varies from strict primogeniture to equal sharing among family members. Under the rule 
of strict primogeniture, the eldest son inherits all the family property and takes the 
responsibility of ruling and protecting the whole family after the father dies. When there 
is no male heir in the family, an adopted son or son-in-law can be crowned as the 
successor. Family businesses in Japan are representative of strict primogeniture (Bhappu, 
2000). In comparison, under the rule of equal inheritance, all children, in some cases all 
sons (chuan-nan bu chuan-nu), receive equal shares of the family assets (Wong, 1985). 
China is a typical example where equal inheritance is broadly adopted. In Chinese family, 
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each household (jia) is the basic unit of the kinship system. The children will take their 
own share of family property (fen jia) after the father dies and start building their own. 
Scholars have argued that the rule of equal inheritance is a reason of the small size of 
Chinese family businesses (Hamilton, 1997). Figure 1 demonstrates the patterns of strict 
primogeniture and equal sharing respectively.  
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
The desire to preserve family legacy is another important norm that is deeply rooted 
in family businesses. John Walton, the son of Walmart’s founder Sam Walton, considers 
family businesses ‘really more as a trust, as a legacy we are responsible for, rather than 
something we own’ (Weber et al., 2003). Due to the emphasis on business survival and 
family control, family controlling owners are inclined to avoid risks. Previous studies 
have shown that family businesses tend to avoid debts, have lower innovations, prefer 
conservative rather than growth-oriented strategies, and place more importance on 
survival than on market returns (Athanassiou et al., 2002; Daily & Dollinger, 1993; 
Gorriz & Fumas, 1996; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). However, the view that family 
businesses are risk averse was challenged recently. For example, Gomez-Mejia and his 
coauthors (2007) argue that controlling family will be more likely to accept performance 
hazard and invest in new ventures when facing relinquishment of socioemotional 
endowment. Hsieh, Yeh and Chen (2010) also demonstrate a positive association 
between family ties and innovation in Taiwanese business groups.  
Last but not least, the use of insiders is a widely applied practice in family 
businesses. Founders of the family businesses tend to rely on narrow kinship networks in 
the hiring process, especially for the organizations’ key positions. Chua, Chrisman and 
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Sharma (1999: 25) refer to the powerful family members involved in the business 
management as the ‘dominant coalition’. Similarly, Hamilton and Kao (1990) use the 
term ‘inner circle’ to refer to the family members who control the overall organizational 
agenda. Scholars have argued that the mutual trust based on shared values and the 
principle of reciprocity among family members ‘create devotion, generosity, and 
solidarity’ within the family business. Therefore, the kinship network serves as the 
valuable ‘family social capital’ that facilitates the sustainability of the family business 
(Arregle et al., 2007). Other scholars, nevertheless, hold opposing views on the impact of 
this practice. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) use the example of Suharto, the former dictator 
in Indonesia, to show that the reliance on kinship can give rise to adverse selection 
problems because the availability of capable family members is usually much less than 
that of talented professional managers. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz (2001) 
argue that the lack of promotional opportunities for non-family employees will lead to 
moral hazards. Non-family employees will be less willing to remain within the family 
business or to make exertions to serve the best interests of the organization. 
 
2.4 Institutional Embeddedness Perspective  
According to the institutional embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985), the 
degree to which controlling owners in business groups will conform to the familial norms 
as mentioned in section 2.3 is primarily determined by their level of embeddedness in the 
family as an institution. Institutional embeddedness generally refers to the social relations 
that affect the individuals’ perceptions, motivations and actions. In his seminal work 
titled ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’, 
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Granovetter (1985) proposes a link between the economic and sociological explanations 
of decision behavior. While the conventional economic approach overlooks or 
misspecifies the impact of social relationships, the institutional embeddedness 
perspective argues that ‘economic action is embedded in social relationships which 
sometimes facilitate and at other times derail exchange’ (Uzzi, 1996: 674). 
Institutional embeddedness is a multidimensional construct and it can be 
categorized into two aspects: the ‘social’ aspect and the ‘cognitive’ aspect (Dacin et al., 
1999; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). Following the previous literature, social embeddedness 
is defined as ‘the impersonal configuration of linkages between people or units’ 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 244). Social embeddedness focuses on the relational 
configuration and has received extensive attention in the network research. Scholars have 
investigated the impacts of social embeddedness from various perspectives, such as 
network centrality (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993), network density (Scott, 2000) and 
structural holes (Burt, 1992).  
Network centrality generally refers to the degree to which an individual falls on the 
shortest path among others (Freeman, 1977). Scholars have employed betweenness, 
closeness and degree to measure network centrality. Empirical studies have shown that 
network centrality is associated with individuals’ level of power, visibility and 
attractiveness of an actor (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994). Accordingly, 
individuals with central network positions can obtain more information and collaborative 
opportunities from a larger pool of actors, and hence are able to lower the uncertainty and 
enhance performance (Gulati, 1998; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Stuart, 1998). Network 
density captures the level of connectivity among network individuals. It is usually 
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calculated by the ratio of the actual connections to the total number of potential 
connections that can be forged within the network (Scott, 1991). Dense network, also 
referred to as ‘closure’ (Coleman, 1988), promotes a normative environment by 
facilitating rapid information dissemination and amplifying trust. The aspect of structural 
hole emerges as an opposing view to the network density argument (Gargiulo & Benassi, 
2000). Burt (1992) refers to structural hole as the lack of connections between two 
individuals. Rather than emphasizing the utility of consistent norms generated from dense 
networks, proponents of the structural hole theory argue that individuals can benefit from 
the existence of brokerage positions. When individuals are positioned between two 
separate network clusters, they can have better access to diverse information and 
resources, and enjoy the autonomy and power to negotiate among separate clusters in the 
social network (Burt, 1992; 1997). 
Cognitive embeddedness refers to the extent to which individuals are constituted by, 
and are committed to, the prevailing institutional practice (Chung & Luo, 2008a). The 
level of cognitive embeddedness is based on key aspects such as interpersonal trust, 
closeness and overlapping identities (Moran, 2005). Individuals who have high cognitive 
embeddedness in a certain institution usually share emotions, values and ideas with each 
other. They develop similar social identification and homogeneous priorities. As a result, 
these individuals will demonstrate loyalty and support to their closely connected 
institution (Dacin et al., 1999; Miller et al., 2010). In the cluster of institutions where 
individuals are inevitably embedded, individuals are usually preoccupied with the 
institution that they are cognitively embedded at the highest level. Individuals tend to 
primarily serve the norms of that institution, even if the norms are inconsistent with those 
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of other institutions that the individuals are also embedded in. Given the same level of 
structural embeddedness, individuals with low cognitive embeddedness are more likely to 
initiate changes. In their study on the Big Five accounting firms, Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) find that these firms had central network positions and thus unique 
opportunities to provide nontraditional services to international customers. The 
opportunities intensified the conflicts between the interests of the Big Five and the 
existing norms in the accounting industry, serving as an incentive for the Big Five to 
initiate institutional changes.  
To summarize, institutional embeddedness perspective stresses that individuals are 
neither innately self-interested nor completely cooperative. Since individuals are 
embedded in multiplex institutions with different structures and relations, their 
expectations and behaviors are regulated by various social relationships. Individuals are 
likely to ‘simultaneously act ‘selfishly’ and cooperatively with different actors in the 
network’ (Uzzi, 1997: 42). What remains unknown is how individuals behave when 
facing divergent social norms and what the performance implications are. As Zukin and 
DiMaggio (1990: 23) point out, the social embeddedness indicates ‘the expression of 
determination by forces… outside any individual’s control’, whereas the cognitive 
embeddedness ‘emphasizes the variability of institutions that are formed by conscious 
action or historical accretion’. Since the controlling owners with high social 
embeddedness in the family institution are not necessarily cognitively embedded 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), it is necessary to investigate both effects on controlling 
owners’ behavioral preference. I will examine how the social embeddedness and 
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cognitive embeddedness influence controlling owners’ incentives to serve family 
interests, and thus their diversification decisions in Chapter 3. 
 
2.5 Diversification and Organizational Performance 
The effects of diversification on organizational performance have been extensively 
studied in the existing literature. This section first reviews the research regarding the 
relationship between organizational performance and diversification in the context of 
public-owned organizations. It then summarizes the current findings on the performance 
implications of diversification in the context of business groups. 
 
2.5.1 Diversification and performance in public-owned organizations 
Research on the diversification-performance relationship in the context of 
public-owned organizations has mostly focused on the degree of diversification, the 
approach to diversification and the role of external environment.  
To begin with, prior studies have analyzed the benefits and the costs related to 
different degrees of diversification. As the degree of diversification increases, 
organizations can increase organizational synergy and efficiency from combining 
complementary resources (Williamson, 1975). Organizations can also possess higher 
market power, which in turn allows predatory pricing and reciprocity in trades (Datta et 
al., 1991; Palepu, 1985). On the other hand, a higher level of diversification can lead to 
higher bureaucratic and control costs, and more difficulties in adapting to environmental 
changes. Diversification has also been considered as an approach to serve managers’ 
self-interests, such as lowering their unemployment risks, at the expense of 
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organizational profits and minority shareholders’ benefits (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Based 
on the cost-and-benefit analysis, some scholars suggest that the intermediate level of 
diversification yields best organizational performance (Montgomery, 1985; Palich et al., 
2000). It is worth noting that the inverted-U relationship between diversification and 
performance does not hold in certain contexts. For example, the performance implication 
of diversification will change when the organization is in the form of business group 
(Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). Meanwhile, family-owned business 
groups are likely to outperform public-owned business groups, both of which are likely to 
outperform state-owned business groups (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
The diversification-performance relationship is also determined by the 
diversification approaches: the relatedness of diversification and the mode of 
diversification. First, early diversification studies proposed that related diversification 
outperform unrelated diversification. The work of Rumelt (1974) is pioneering among 
this line of research. He documents that the differences of organizational performance is 
partly attributed to the relationships the organizations establish among various lines of 
businesses. Organizations will achieve the highest profitability when they diversify 
primarily into areas that require certain common core skill or resources. Those with the 
lowest performance are likely to engage in vertically integrated businesses or unrelated 
diversifications. Rumelt’s finding has been corroborated in subsequent studies. Palepu 
(1984) finds that firms with predominantly related diversification significantly 
outperform those with predominantly unrelated diversifications. Similarly, Varadarajan 
and Ramanujam (1987) demonstrate that related diversification outperforms unrelated 
35 
 
diversification in general. However, they do not find any significant performance 
differential between extremely low levels and extremely high levels of diversification.  
The positive association between related diversification and organizational 
performance is recently challenged in studies that systematically analyze the differences 
between related and unrelated diversifications. For example, Gary (2005) finds that 
related diversification can have negative impacts on performance with inadequate shared 
resources and inefficient operations across organization. Pehrsson (2006) shows that high 
relatedness is associated with significantly lower corporate profitability. He argues that 
the concentration on a certain business can cause difficulty in realizing economies of 
scope and high vulnerability to environmental changes. Collis, Young and Goold (2007) 
propose that the performance implications of related and unrelated diversification depend 
on the organizational structure, such as the size and roles of headquarters. Related 
diversification requires a relatively large headquarter or a choice of more strategic forms 
of control, whereas unrelated diversification requires less coordination by corporate 
entities and less intervention in functional business decisions. 
While previous studies on diversification-performance relationship generally adopt 
the SIC code to measure the relatedness of diversification, more recent research advances 
our understanding by investigating the diversification relatedness based on multiple 
organizational levels and attributes (e.g. product-market, resource and value chain). Davis, 
Robinson, Pearce and Park (1992) investigate the relationship between relatedness and 
performance at the business unit level. They conclude that a higher level of marketing 
relatedness and production relatedness is associated with better performance measured by 
sales growth and ROA. Stimpert and Duhaime (1997) analyze organizational 
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diversification from a behavioral perspective. They propose that managers’ perception of 
relatedness is a multidimensional construct. While it is highly correlated with the widely 
used Herfindahl and entropy measures, managers’ perception of relatedness also includes 
other dimensions such as product design, brand name, R&D and new product 
development.  
Second, the mode of diversification is another important diversification approach 
that influences the effects of diversification on organizational performance. The 
discussion has mainly focused on diversification through internal development and 
acquisition. The preference between these approaches is determined by a variety of 
industry and organizational factors, such as the availability of funds, the organization’s 
core competency, the assessment of the target firms and the level of market concentration 
(Chatterjee, 1990; Datta et al., 1991; Pennings et al., 1994). Only recently has strategic 
alliance been considered as an alternative diversification approach and the antecedents of 
inter-firm cooperation is discussed (Sanchez-Peinado & Menguzzato-Boulard, 2009). 
However, there is a notable lack of understanding of the performance implications of 
alternative diversification approaches. 
In addition, studies have shown that industry matters in the relationship between 
diversification and performance. Sharma and Kesner (1996) argue that industry factors 
have a stronger effect on diversification performance than firm-level variables. Santalo 
and Becerra (2008) find that firms will have better performance when they diversify in 
industries with a small number of non-diversified competitors. Based on a systematic 
literature review, Purkayastha, Manolova and Edelman (2012) posit that the relationship 
between diversification and performance changes in different industries. Studies adopting 
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the aggregate approach may fail to capture the intra-industry variation and thus generate 
misleading results.  
The effects of diversification on organizational performance also vary across 
nations. Drawing on a sample of manufacturing firms in Denmark, France, Germany, 
Spain, U.K. and U.A., Bobillo, Lopez-Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite (2008) show that the 
competitive advantages gained from diversification are subject to various institutional 
factors. Chakrabarti, Singh and Mahmood (2007) demonstrate that diversification has a 
negative impact on organizations in more developed institutions, but a positive 
association with performance in the least developed environments. Furthermore, based on 
140 Korean manufacturing multinational companies, Kim, Kim and Hoskisson (2010) 
find that even within the same country, different stages of institutional change can 
moderate the relationship between diversification and performance.  
 
2.5.2 Diversification and performance in business groups 
Prior research on the moderating effect of group affiliation on the diversification- 
performance relationship has largely drawn on the resource based view and the agency 
theory. From the resource based view (Barney, 1991), scholars argue that firms affiliated 
with business groups can obtain reputation benefits, knowledge spillovers and privileged 
access to resources. Meanwhile, business groups can internalize the costs associated with 
strategic management and generate greater value for the individual group firms. 




The argument for a positive moderating effect of group affiliation has been 
demonstrated in several empirical studies. Lee, Peng and Lee (2008) find a diversification 
premium in business group-affiliated companies based on 751 firms from South Korea. 
Using a sample of firms in India, George and Kabir (2012) show that diversification 
improves firm performance for those affiliated to large business groups. Hsieh, Yeh and 
Chen (2010) also provide evidence from Taiwanese companies that group diversification 
has a positive impact on firms’ innovation performance.  
Agency theory is another commonly applied theory in the investigation of the 
diversification-performance relationship in business groups. From an agency viewpoint, 
scholars propose that controlling owners in business groups tend to use diversification to 
expropriate resources from minority shareholders, especially when the business groups 
are arranged in the pyramidal structure (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Morck et al., 2005). This phenomenon can cause principal-principal conflicts and thus 
generate a negative impact on firm performance (Kali & Sarkar, 2011; Schulze et al., 
2001) 
The agency perspective of group affiliation has also received empirical supports in 
prior studies. For instance, Ferris, Kim and Kitsabunnarat (2003) and Bae, Kwon and Lee 
(2011) observe that business groups tend to pursue profit stability, over-invest in low 
performing industries and cross-subsidize the weaker group firms. As a result, firms 
associated with diversified business groups are likely to encounter value loss. Singh, 
Nejadmalayeri and Mathur (2007) show that diversification by business group affiliates 
leads to cost inefficiencies and poor performance. Based on a sample of Indian firms, 
Gaur and Kumar (2009) find that firms’ affiliation to business groups negatively 
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moderates the relationship between diversification and firm performance. Furthermore, 
contradictory to the findings by Hsieh, Yeh and Chen (2010), Chang, Chung and 
Mahmood (2006) demonstrate that diversification in business groups can inhibit 
individual firms’ innovativeness.  
In addition to the above opposing findings, there is empirical evidence suggesting 
group affiliation has little impact on the relationship between diversification and 
performance. Buysschaert, Deloof, Jegers and Rommens (2008) and P (2007) show that 
the performance of firms’ diversification strategy is independent of their affiliation to 
business groups. Doukas, Holmen and Travlos (2002) suggest diversifying acquisition in 
business groups may not be motivated by the expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Group firms cannot achieve significant gains from diversifying or focusing investment. 
Moreover, Chakrabarti, Singh and Mahmood (2007) indicate that except for situating in a 
less developed institutional environment, firms’ affiliation with business groups generally 
does not improve the outcome of diversification,.  
Table 1 summarizes the major findings of the relationship between diversification 
and performance in business groups. The ambiguous role of business group indicates the 
need for a more thorough examination. The curvilinear pattern between the level of 
diversification and the performance of business groups, demonstrated both in a sample of 
Chilean firms (Khanna & Palepu, 200b) and a sample of Indian firms (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000c), suggests the importance of incorporating both the costs and the benefits of group 
affiliation into the analysis.  
-----Insert Table 1 about here----- 
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I will investigate the diversification-performance relationship in Chapter 5. In 
particular, I will examine how the level of diversification and the mode of diversification 
affect the performance of business groups in emerging economies. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FAMILY EMBEDDEDNESS AND DIVERSIFICATION IN 
BUSINESS GROUPS 
 
According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), family ownership and 
control is predominant in countries with weak institutional environment. This finding has 
been corroborated in subsequent studies on Asian countries (Bertrand et al., 2008; 
Claessens et al., 2000) and European countries (Faccio & Lang, 2002). The fact that large 
groups of companies in emerging economies are in the hand of wealthy families has 
challenged Berle and Means’ image of diffuse ownership in the modern corporation and 
the conventional notion that the term ‘family firm’ is a synonym for ‘small firm’ (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005).  
The literature of business groups has considered the family or the kinship group as a 
common social relationship that influences business groups’ objectives and goals 
(Granovetter, 1994; Orru, Biggart, & Hamilton, 1997). The prevalence of family or 
kinship in business groups facilitates trust in the organization. It also reduces intra-group 
transaction costs by encouraging information dissemination and reducing the possibility 
of contractual disputes among group firms (Granovetter, 2005; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). 
On the other hand, the role of family in business groups is viewed through the 
noneconomic lens. Business group with predominant family involvement is considered as 
a social network structure that primarily serves the family interests and norms, rather than 
seeking to achieve economic objectives (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 
2000b; Orru et al., 1997). In order to serve the non-economic family interests, the 
controlling owners will use business groups as an instrument to serve parochial purpose 
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at the expense of other stakeholders, thus exacerbating the agency problems (Schulze et 
al., 2001). The use of pyramidal structure in business groups to tunnel resources is one of 
the most documented approaches for the controlling owners to maximize their family 
welfare (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). 
Although the intention to pursue family interests has been repeatedly tested in 
organizations with predominant family involvement, its implication on business groups’ 
diversification propensity is ambiguous. For example, Miller, Le Breton-Miller and 
Lester (2010) view diversification as a means for controlling owners to spread risks 
inherent in the investment portfolio of the controlling family. It also provides learning 
opportunities for controlling owners without threatening or causing conflicts with the 
core business. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) consider diversification as an 
efficient strategy for the controlling owners to reduce risks and propose a positive effect 
of family ownership and control on the level of corporate diversification. In contrast, 
Gomez-Mejia, Makri and Kintana (2010) argue that diversification can lead to family 
control loss and harm the fundamental interests of the whole family. Therefore, family 
controlling owners will rather accept the financial risks of concentrated business and opt 
for non-diversification strategy.  
A plausible reason for the seemingly contradictory argument is the assumption of 
homogeneity across family businesses. While the controlling owners can be primarily 
driven to maximize the family welfare during their diversification decisions, they are 
simultaneously embedded in multiplex institutions and hence are subject to other 
institutional forces (Gerlach, 1992; Goto, 1982; Khanna & Rivkin, 2006). Without 
investigating the extent to which the controlling owners are embedded in the family 
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institution, it is difficult to determine whether the controlling owners in business groups 
will place the primary concerns on the family welfare. Another explanation for the 
inconclusive findings is the lack of attention to different types of embeddedness in family 
and their distinct impacts on controlling owners’ diversification decisions. Using the Big 
Five accounting firms as the empirical context, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) 
distinguish the effects of social embeddedness and cognitive embeddedness on the 
companies’ initiation to change. Similarly, Chung and Luo (2008a) point to the 
importance of incorporating both aspects in the understanding of controlling owners’ 
strategic decisions in business groups.  
Accordingly, I explore how the invisible hand of family influences controlling 
owners’ diversification decision in business groups from two aspects: controlling owners’ 
social embeddedness and cognitive embeddedness in their family. Following the previous 
literature, I define social embeddedness as the extent to which the controlling owners are 
connected to other actors in the institution (Dacin et al., 1999; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). 
I define cognitive embeddedness as the extent to which the controlling owners are 
constituted by, and are committed to, the prevailing practice of the institution (Chung & 
Luo, 2008a). As Zukin and DiMaggio (1990: 23) point out, the social embeddedness 
indicates ‘the expression of determination by forces… outside any individual’s control,’ 
whereas the cognitive embeddedness ‘emphasizes the variability of institutions that are 
formed by conscious action or historical accretion’.  
 
3.1 Social Embeddedness and Level of Diversification in Business Groups  
Controlling owners’ social embeddedness in family institution is defined as the 
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extent to which the controlling owners are connected to their family members. When 
controlling owners of business groups have high social embeddedness in family 
institution, they will face strong imperatives to conform to the familial norms. Prior 
literature has documented three key familial norms that are commonly observed in the 
family business, namely inheritance and conflict avoidance, preservation of family legacy 
and the reliance on insiders (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). I will elaborate below how each 
of these familial norms influences controlling owners’ decision of diversification.  
First, the norm of inheritance and conflict avoidance often requires equal sharing 
among family members to avoid potential conflicts among family members. This practice 
is particularly evident in Chinese businesses that are deeply influenced by the Confucian 
belief system (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Chrisman, Chua, Pearson and Barnett (2010) 
refer to such long-term orientation to sustain family involvement beyond the current 
generation as the transgenerational family control intention. The rule of inheritance and 
conflict avoidance is reflected by a famous quote from Wang You-theng, a business 
tycoon in Taiwan. According to Wang, ‘if one family member gets a Mercedes-Benz, I 
will make sure every other family member will also have one’ (Wealth Magazine, 1991). 
By pursuing diversification in business groups, controlling owners can prepare for the 
(equal) distribution of family property among family members. Moreover, diversification 
creates learning environment and career opportunities for the descendents. According to 
the founder of Veronesi, the third largest firm in food industry in Italy, the purpose of 
diversifying into financial sector is ‘to enhance the succession process by giving shares to 
all my five children and in particular an increasing responsibility to the three males, who 
were actively involved in the business’ (Lassini & Salvato, 2010: 74).  
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Second, controlling owners who have the imperative to preserve family legacy will 
have strong desires to ensure the survival of business groups. Such desire will lead to 
excessive risk aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and thus the preference of 
diversification (Miller et al., 2010; Morck et al., 2005). Moreover, previous studies have 
shown that closed kinship may escalate the conflicts of interests related to power, status 
and property (Chung & Luo, 2008b). Diversification becomes an effective solution to 
ensure harmony and fairness in the controlling family. As a controlling owner points out, 
‘In 1970s, I found all my sons became mature. If all of them joined the same business, it 
would be risky and conflict would be inevitable. I therefore diversified our business to 
different areas. For instance, since my eldest son has good connections and experience in 
semiconductor production, I went into this field and made him responsible for it. My 
second son has an interest in button production and he was then assigned to take charge 
of this area. My third and fourth sons lead the property investment firm. Each son has his 
own territory’ (Zhang, 2002: 305-306). Figure 2 demonstrates the average number of 
diversifications by the sale change in Taiwanese business groups. An upward trend of 
diversification appears when the group sale further drops from -10 million Taiwan dollar. 
This pattern indicates that controlling owners are more likely to use diversification to 
preserve family legacy when the business underperformance is critical. It is also 
consistent with the findings that family businesses are more likely to diversify when the 
controlling owners encounter high systematic and unsystematic risks and declining 
performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
Third, under the practice of using insiders, controlling owners of business groups 
tend to involve family members in the ‘inner circle’ of the business and rely on inherent 
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trust and mutual obligation (Hamilton & Kao, 1990; Luo & Chung, 2005). For example, 
Heck and Trent (1999) show that 73 percent of family-owned businesses in their sample 
hire at least two family members. Moreover, from a resource-based viewpoint, a large 
and tightly coupled kinship network constitutes an environment that ‘reinforce(s) the 
creation and use of social capital…from the dynamic factors of stability, interdependence, 
transactions, and closure common in families’ (Arregle et al., 2007: 76). The valuable 
‘family social capital’ enhances the understanding of organizational values and schemes, 
thus facilitates the integration between the new and the existing businesses. A large 
family also serves as a readily available talent pool that effectively reduces the risks of 
family control loss during the process of diversification. Consistently, Figure 3 
demonstrates that the average number of diversifications, particularly unrelated 
diversifications, is larger for business groups with family involvement from multiple 
generations.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The larger the family size the controlling owners have, the higher the 
level of diversification they will pursue in business groups.  
-----Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here----- 
 
3.2 Social Embeddedness and Mode of Diversification in Business Groups  
The mode of entry is another important decision in the process of diversification. 
For any diversifying entrant, controlling owners need to make a decision between 
diversification through a new division and diversification through a new firm (Chatterjee, 
1990; Lee & Lieberman, 2010; Yip, 1982). 
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I argue when the controlling owners of business groups have a large family size and 
are deeply rooted in the family institution, they will opt for diversification through a new 
firm for three reasons. First, the norm of inheritance and conflict avoidance requires 
dividing the business property among family members. Compared to partitioning a 
vertically integrated company, partitioning a collection of legally independent firms will 
incur less erosion of the established business and the long-term lineage assets. Take the 
Tsai family in Taiwan for example. In 1957, Tsai Wan-Chun started the family business 
as a soy sauce manufacturer with his two younger brothers Tsai Wan-Lin and Tsai 
Wan-Cai. The family business soon gained fast growth by diversifying into multiple 
industries, such as retail, hotel, plastic manufacturing, insurance and construction. The 
Tsai brothers mainly applied the external approach and established legally independent 
firms during the diversification process. In 1979, Tsai Wan-Chun, the elder brother in the 
Tsai family, fell ill and had to step down from the controlling owner position. The family 
business was then divided mainly into three parts. The second brother Tsai Wan-Lin 
gained the largest pie of the family business. Tsai Chen-Nan, the eldest son of Tsai 
Wan-Chun, and Tsai Wan-Cai became the controlling owners of the rest companies. In 
this case, the external diversification approach through a new firm facilitates the 
separation of Tsai family’s business empire, which was then developed into three distinct 
business groups.  
Second, controlling owners of business groups who are obliged to conform to 
familial norms will have strong incentives to preserve family legacy. Diversification 
through separately registered firms helps isolate risks (Miller et al., 2010; Morck & 
Yeung, 2003), because the family business can be protected by the limited liability in the 
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circumstance where diversification fails. The loss of the controlling family will not 
exceed its initial investment (Morck et al., 2005). Furthermore, previous studies suggest 
that diversification through a new firm is a channel to modify the ownership structure 
through pyramidal or horizontal structure. By doing so, controlling owners can maximize 
family control and access the retained earnings of diversification (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 
2006). The diversification into hotel industry by Rebar Group in Taiwan is a good 
example to demonstrate how the controlling owners pursue family interests by 
expropriating shareholder benefits (Wealth Magazine, 1991). 
Rebar group is a large family-owned business group in Taiwan. The founder of 
Rebar Group, Wang You-theng, has a wife, three concubines and altogether eight 
children (six sons and two daughters). Rebar Group was composed of a collection of 
independent firms including China Rebar Corporation, China Hsin Flour, Feed and 
Vegetable Oil Corporation, China Scene Enterprise Corporation, Leicock Investment 
Corporation, Leihsin Investment Corporation, Union Insurance Corporation and Yeou 
Tair Business Corporation.  
Rebar Group diversified into the hotel industry in 1985. Leicock Investment 
Corporation, a private firm largely held by the controlling family, acquired Carnival 
Hotel for around 200 million Taiwan dollars. It then rented the hotel to China Rebar 
Corporation, a public-owned firm in Rebar Group. In the same year, China Rebar paid 
Leicock Investment 160 million Taiwan dollar as hotel management deposit with 9 
percent annual interest rate. While the deposit appeared to be a guarantee for cooperation 
between the two firms, it was indeed a cheap loan from China Rebar to Leicock 
Investment. In addition, China Rebar paid 400 million Taiwan dollar to Leicock 
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Investment for interior decoration. Since the hotel launching in 1986, China Rebar and 
Leicock Investment reached an agreement to waive the interest that Leicock Investment 
was to pay China Rebar. Instead, China Rebar would pay 8 percent of the dining revenue 
and 10 percent of the guestroom revenue to Leicock Investment from 1989. The payment 
was 38 million Taiwan dollar in 1989 and 33 million in 1990. In 1989, China Rebar and 
another public-owned group firm, China Hsin Flour, Feed and Vegetable Oil Corporation, 
sold all their shareholding of Leicock Investment to another private-owned firm in the 
Rebar Group, Leihsin Investment Corporation. However, the price of this internal trade 
was less than one tenth of the stock value of Leicock Investment, costing a loss of nearly 
500 million Taiwan dollar for both public-owned companies, China Rebar and China 
Hsin Flour.  
During this diversification process, the controlling family of Rebar Group leveraged 
on the shareholders’ investment in China Rebar to fund the acquisition of Carnival Hotel. 
The family-owned Leicock Investment was able to earn from the interior decoration 
which worth 400 million Taiwan dollar, the increased land value and the 30 million 
(Taiwan dollar) average annual revenue. The internal trade for shareholding further 
revealed the controlling owner’s purpose to appropriate shareholder interests and 
maximize family welfare (see Figure 4 for an illustration of the diversification process).  
Third, when controlling owners of business groups are closely associated with their 
family members, they will be subject to the norm of using insiders. Controlling owners 
will tend to place their family members to powerful positions, such as top executives and 
board chairs. External diversification creates space for the promotion of family members 
and provides more opportunities to nurture them. The delegation of large responsibility to 
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family members serves not only as a better career incentive (Morck et al., 2005), but also 
as a way to foster their identification with the family business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). 
Meanwhile, assigning family members to diversifying firms helps form an ‘inner circle’ 
in the family business (Luo & Chung, 2005). Based on common goal and mutual trust, 
the ‘inner circle’ can enhance management efficiency and the synergy between the new 
and the incumbent businesses. Iacobucci and Rosa (2010) consider the ‘inner circle’ in 
family business as an ‘entrepreneurial team’ that is critical in the formation and the 
diversification of business groups. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The larger the family size the controlling owners have, the more 
likely they will pursue diversifications in business groups through a new firm than 
through a new division. 
-----Insert Figure 4 about here----- 
 
3.3 Cognitive Embeddedness and Diversification in Business Groups  
Controlling owners’ cognitive embeddedness in family is defined as the extent to 
which the controlling owners identify themselves with the family and are committed to 
the practice of the family institution (Chung & Luo, 2008a). I argue that controlling 
owners of business groups who are the second generation or who have received foreign 
education will have less cognitive embeddedness in family, and hence will be less likely 





Compared to the second-generation controlling owners, the founder-generation 
generally develops stronger affective attachment to the business groups due to their 
personal investment and the family identification that often bears their names. Their 
inextricable bonding with the business groups makes the perpetuation of family control 
the primary consideration during their diversification decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). In contrast, the second-generation controlling owners usually have not 
experienced the stage of business formation. They tend not to have as much 
psychological commitment to the business groups as their father generation does.  
Furthermore, the second-generation controlling owners may not enjoy the privilege 
and status in the business groups as the first-generation. They may face conflicts with 
other family executives, which in turn form a constant power contest that reduces the 
second generation’s cognitive attachment to the family institution. They will perceive 
fewer obligations to serve family interests, and are more willing to seek for their own 
interests in their diversification decisions.  
Third, the second-generation controlling owners often face fierce competition and 
challenges from their siblings due to the norm of inheritance (Bertrand et al., 2008; 
Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). They will be under greater pressure to demonstrate their 
capability and credibility. This is reflected by a professional manager’s comment: ‘what 
the successor has is all from his father, but his capability is not necessarily stronger than 
mine’ (CommonWealth, 1999: 74). Therefore, the second-generation controlling owners 
are unlikely to primarily serve the non-economic family considerations, yet exert more 
efforts to improve the financial return of the business groups. 
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Previous studies have generally documented a negative association between 
extensive diversification and financial performance (Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1974; 
Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). Although intra-industry diversification can lead to 
economies of scale and premiums from mutual forbearance (Li & Greenwood, 2004), 
recent studies have found that inter-industry related diversification can negatively 
influence organizational performance even when substantial synergies exist (Gary, 2005). 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2003b: 657), although ‘corporate diversification may 
be an effective investment strategy’ to mitigate risks for the controlling family, it runs the 
risks of ‘creating severe conflicts with the firm’s other constituents’. Since the 
second-generation controlling owners tend to attach more importance to the economic 
considerations than the family welfare, they will be less likely to pursue extensive 
diversifications than the founder-generation.  
Furthermore, the cost of diversification through the approach of new firm is higher 
than through the approach of new division. Since diversification through a new firm is a 
larger move than a new division, the former will generate more operating costs and 
require more capital resources. Business groups may need to draw on external funds, 
which can give rise to scrutiny by the capital market and raise the costs of acquiring 
complementary resources (Chatterjee & Singh, 1999). In addition, the establishment of a 
new firm is more likely to generate resources that duplicate the excess resources in the 
business groups. Furthermore, prior studies have shown that organizations tend to receive 





Hypothesis 3 (H3): The second-generation controlling owners will pursue lower level of 
diversifications in business groups than the founder-generation. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The second-generation controlling owners are less likely to pursue 
diversifications in business groups through a new firm than the founder-generation. 
 
3.3.2 Education background 
Previous research has established the connection between controlling owners’ 
education background and their adoption of institutionally contested practices under 
normative pressure (Palmer et al., 1993; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). Controlling owners 
who are exposed to foreign education, especially the business education from the U.S., 
are likely to be influenced by the Western management style that advocates transparency, 
efficiency and democracy in corporate governance and favors the separation of 
ownership and control. This is in contrast with the familial management style, which 
emphasizes family as a primary social group and the stability of business performance. 
As noted by Raltson, Holt, Terpstra and Yu (2007: 13) in their seminal work on the 
impact of national culture and economic ideology on organizational management, the 
distinguished management styles ‘represent two extremes in the sense of Western and 
Eastern beliefs, religious underpinnings, and social values’. Consequently, the experience 
of foreign education can change controlling owners’ cognitive perspectives on the family 
and organizational management. Instead of maximizing family welfare in their decision 
makings, these controlling owners tend to weaken their cultural biases about the family 
business practice and increase their independent evaluation of the economic 
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consequences of diversification decisions. Consistently, previous research shows that 
family business executives with U.S. education background tend to consider themselves 
as professional managers and divert from Asian family management style to the 
professional model of leadership (Chung & Luo, 2008a). 
In addition, controlling owners with foreign education background are likely to 
acquire knowledge of organizational practices outside their primary institutional 
environment than those without such education background. The experience of foreign 
education is likely to enable controlling owners to become aware of alternative business 
practices and assess the economic efficiency. For example, the negative association 
between excessive diversifications and organizational performance is a well recognized 
empirical finding in the U.S. business models. When controlling owners from emerging 
economies familiarize themselves with such practices, they may adopt a less aggressive 
approach of diversification.  
Gu Zhongliang, the controlling owner of the He Xin Business Group, is a typical 
example of those who have received Western management education, and have adopted 
the professional model of leadership and the performance-based practices. Gu has an 
MBA degree in the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the working 
experience in multiple prestigious foreign financial institutes. He has made drastic 
changes in the organization since he became the controlling owner of the family business. 
According to him, an organization cannot purely rely on ‘familism’. The He Xin Group 
‘did not fire employees before, but it has started firing employees in recent years… 
Situations have changed now. Why do the capable have to be responsible for those 
incompetent? …I need to train and improve those incompetent employees. However, if 
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they fail to reach the standard within six month, I am afraid that I have to fire them’ 
(Tomorrow’s Star: 137-139).  
Accordingly, while controlling owners under the influence of familism tend to 
primarily serve their family welfare in their diversification decisions, their priority can be 
reversed by the influence of the foreign education and the Western ideology.  
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The controlling owners with foreign education will pursue lower level 
of diversifications in business groups than those without foreign education.  
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The controlling owners with foreign education are less likely to 
pursue diversifications in business groups through a new firm than those without foreign 
education. 
 
To sum up, I examine how the level of family embeddedness influences controlling 
owners’ diversification decisions in business groups in this chapter. I propose that 
controlling owners’ decisions on the level and the mode of diversification are determined 
by their embeddedness in the family. Controlling owners will pursue higher level of 
diversification and have higher propensity to diversify through new firms when they are 
more socially embedded (larger family size) or more cognitively embedded 
(founder-generation or foreign education) in the family. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONTINGENCY OF CONTROLLING OWNERS’ 
DIVERSIFICATION DECISIONS IN BUSINESS GROUPS 
 
Prior studies on family businesses have identified two sets of contingencies as being 
particularly important in controlling owners’ diversification decisions: control 
concentration and external environment (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Datta et al., 1991; 
David et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2008; Montgomery, 1994). In this chapter, I will examine 
how these contingencies influence the relationship between controlling owners’ 
embeddedness in family and their diversification decisions. Particularly, I will explore 
the moderating effects of the level of control concentration in business groups and the 
level of institutional development. 
 
4.1 Control Concentration 
Control concentration refers to the level of power possessed by the controlling 
owner of the organization (Chung & Luo, 2008b). Prior studies have documented the 
presence of control concentration in family business, notably through the pyramidal 
structure (La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). The pyramidal structure is a structure 
where a firm controls several companies, each of which controls yet more companies. By 
creating a deviation between control rights and cash flow rights, the pyramidal structure 
enhances controlling owners’ power in the whole organization (La Porta et al., 1999).  
Drawing on agency theory, controlling owners of the family businesses are assumed 
to have invariant behavioral preference and constantly place the family interests as their 
primary reference in the decision making process. The pyramidal structure in business 
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groups generates the deviation between control rights and cash flow rights, which in turn 
allows the controlling owners to expropriate from other minority shareholders. Previous 
research proposes that controlling owners will choose to diversify extensively to achieve 
their family agenda at the expense of other stakeholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et 
al., 2001).  
While the control concentration in business groups allows resource tunneling, it is 
important to note that the control concentration structure emerges for various purposes. 
According to Gareth Ackerman, the chairman of Pick n Pay Holdings, a family-owned 
business needs pyramid control because it ‘enabled us to take the long view when 
devising strategy, considering plans for expansion and assessing the risks of future 
investment. That we would, have been unable to do had we been restrained by the 
demands of majority institutional investors or private equity shareholders for immediate 
returns and short-term benefit’ (Ackerman, 2011). In addition, he points out that control 
concentration is important in protecting family values and preventing a hostile takeover.   
Given the variations in why and how control concentration is created and utilized 
across business groups, it is invalid to use the level of control concentration as a proxy 
for controlling owners’ self-serving agency behaviors. Alternatively, in this study, I argue 
that controlling owners’ decision behavior is variable, depending on the multiplex social 
groups they are embedded in. The level of control concentration, on the other hand, plays 
a facilitating role in aligning controlling owners’ primary social interests with their 
decisions of diversification for the following reasons. 
First, the pursuit of diversification requires resources such as financial capital and 
human capital. The controlling owners can diversify either with their own wealth or with 
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the retained earnings of other business group firms. Controlling owners with concentrated 
control will have the advantage of leveraging the internal capital under their own control. 
Accordingly, it will be easier for them to raise funding for new entrants, especially those 
in capital-intensive industries (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). Without the control 
concentration arrangement, controlling owners will find it more difficult to implement the 
diversifications given the organizational inertia to change. More importantly, Masulis, 
Pham and Zein (2011) find that it is the controlling owners’ ownership and control, rather 
than their cash flow rights, that are positively related to the market value of the 
diversifying entrant. Given the often large valuation discount demanded by other 
stakeholders (who anticipate controlling family’s expropriation of their investment), the 
controlling owners’ ability to leverage internal capital is essential to reduce the costs 
from external fund raising. 
Second, the control concentration enhances the authority of the controlling owners 
in business groups. Controlling owners are able to act under fewer internal constraints 
and exempt themselves from the bureaucratic practices such as formalized human 
resources management (Carney, 2005). Meanwhile, high control concentration allows 
controlling owners to attenuate constraints to their discretion. Unlike professional 
managers in the diffuse and impersonal structure of authority, controlling owners with 
concentrated control will be less subject to external constraints associated with 
accountability, disclosure and transparency (Carney, 2005; Morck et al., 1988). 
Consequently, when diversification opportunities emerge, these controlling owners can 
respond rapidly on the basis of their heuristics or ‘gut feelings’. The liberty to allocate 
resources is especially advantageous in environment characterized by weak property 
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rights protection, high expropriation risks, and high product and organizational 
innovation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Terry Tai-Ming Guo is a good example of controlling 
owners with concentrated control in business groups. Guo is the founder and chairman of 
the Foxconn Technology Group, now the largest maker of electronic components in the 
world. Guo has a dominant influence in the organization’s practices and strategies to the 
extent that his quotes were compiled as posters and books, and then used as guidelines for 
over 600 thousand employees in the group (Figure 5). 
-----Insert Figure 5 about here----- 
Furthermore, diversification can entail direct competitions against existing 
businesses, intensifying organizational inertia against diversification or any other 
structural changes. Morck and Yeung (2004) use an example of a maker of superior 
plastic pipes and a maker of copper pipes to illustrate how diversification can cannibalize 
the existing businesses in the organization. In markets with independent firms, the copper 
industry has been declining over years, thus the producers of plastic pipe have good 
potential to compete against the copper pipe incumbents. However, the investment in 
plastic pipe production may not go smoothly because of the inertia from an existing 
sector that is engaging in the copper pipe business. Therefore, the implementation of 
diversification decision can be challenging without effective organizational coordination. 
When the level of control concentration is high, business sectors in the organization will 
have less autonomy and power to resist structural changes. The centralized organizational 
control will give controlling owners more managerial discretion to mobilize 
organizational resources, thus will facilitate the implementation of diversification. 
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In addition to the conflicts for organizational resources, diversification can also lead 
to tensions among family members. Given the norm of inheritance in family business, 
family members will expect (equal) sharing of family property. When opportunities of 
diversification arise, family members may disagree on issues such as who should be 
responsible for the potential diversification, from whose companies or divisions resources 
should be reallocated and how the benefits of family members should be balanced 
(Chung & Luo, 2008b). When the controlling owners have limited power over the final 
managerial decision, they will need to spend more time and energy to carve out 
(relatively) equal territories for the descendants, and to coordinate different priorities and 
preferences among family members.  
To summarize, the level of control concentration should not be considered as an 
indicator of controlling owners’ agency behaviors. Rather, it should be considered as a 
moderator of the relationship between business group controlling owners’ family 
embeddedness and their decisions of diversification. The level of control concentration 
influences controlling owners’ capability to serve their primary social interests, and thus 
their diversification decisions. I argue that the pursuit of diversification opportunities 
requires fast response and the process of diversification can lead to organizational inertia 
and family conflicts. When the organizational control is highly concentrated, controlling 
owners will respond to the diversification opportunity in a timelier manner, and have 




Hypothesis 7 (H7): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size and 
their propensity to diversify will be strengthened when there is a higher level of control 
concentration in business groups. 
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size and 
their propensity to diversify through a new firm will be strengthened when there is a 
higher level of control concentration in business groups. 
 
4.2 Institutional Development 
The transition of emerging economies typically features with the underdeveloped 
market infrastructure and the deregulations that remove constraints of resource mobility 
and market competition (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). The institutional change generates 
high uncertainty and ambiguity, but also unprecedented abundance of opportunities (Luo 
& Chung, 2005; Peng, 2003). The gradually increased economic liberalization and 
flexibility usually scales up foreign inward investment, which later becomes an important 
driving force for the growth of the indigenous firms and the national economy (Gu & Lu, 
2011). 
As institutions develop, the increasing presence of foreign companies will spread 
the Western ideologies and organizational models in emerging economies. Previous 
studies have shown that the Western management practices adopted by foreign investors, 
especially those from the U.S. and U.K. who have ‘inherently strong cognitive beliefs 
and values’ about the Western model (Peng, 2003: 290), can generate conflicts with the 
prevailing institutional practices in emerging economies. Foreign firms tend to be less 
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bounded by the cultural legacies of emerging economies, yet are more adapted to the 
institutional pressure for market-based competition and profit maximization (Guillen, 
1994; Peng, 2003). For example, a foreign investor in venture capital industry shared the 
story of a Chinese company who approached him, proposed a syndicate investment to a 
local SME and attempted to charge a ‘matchmaking fee’ for the syndicate. ‘This really 
turned us away. That is not our way of doing business,’ the foreign investor commented 
(Field Interview, 2008)1
One of the most conflicting ideologies documented between the emerging 
economies and the Western advanced economies is the perception of family involvement 
in the organizational management. In emerging economies where formal 
market-supporting institutions are lacking, family relationship is usually considered as a 
valuable social capital for organizations because it enhances trust and reduces transaction 
costs. In contrast, in Western advanced economies, family involvement is often perceived 
as ‘the breeding ground for secretive practices, dictatorship, and protection of family 
interests at the expense of external investors’ (
. 
Luo & Chung, 2005: 415). Western 
investors tend to embrace separate ownership and control, professionalism and 
transparency, but associate the family involvement in business with a sign of poor 
corporate governance (Coombes & Watson, 2001). In the context of business groups in 
emerging economies, anecdotal evidences have demonstrated that a large number of 
family members in the inner circle will cause a legitimacy discount to the business groups. 
In an interview with Liangsong Gu, the controlling owner of China Trust Group (Shang 
Yeh Chou Kan, 2004), he mentioned that he once appointed his son-in-law, Junzhe Chen, 
                                                          
1 The interviews were conducted with ten venture capitalists at the Annual Conference of Zero2ipo in 
Shanghai in December 2008. 
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as the treasurer of the group affiliate China Trust bank. Despite Junzhen Chen’s 
long-term professional experience at Goldman Sachs, this appointment sent a negative 
signal to the foreign investors and eventually caused an immediate withdrawal of the 
foreign investment.  
As the institution develops, controlling owners in business groups will face higher 
pressure to compromise the family interests and conform to the Western management 
practice, in order to enhance legitimacy and the opportunities to receive foreign 
investment. In their study on the cultural difference between China and Japan, Ralston, 
Holt, Terpstra and Yu (1997: 22) find that the importance attached to family is 
significantly higher in China than in Japan. They interpret it as a result of the historic 
crossvergence effect, namely, ‘fifty years of Western ideological influence, combined 
with the Confucian-based importance that Eastern cultures attach to in-group membership, 
has led to an integration of economic ideology and national culture that, in turn, has 
resulted in the ‘company family’ becoming the referent in-group in Japan’. Following 
this logic, I propose that with the same level of social embeddedness in family, 
controlling owners will be less likely to use diversification as an approach to maximize 
their family welfare at the later stage of institutional development. 
 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size and 
their propensity to diversify will be weakened as institution develops. 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size 




CHAPTER FIVE: PERFORMANCE IMPLICATION OF CONTROLLING 
OWNERS’ DIVERSIFICATION DECISIONS IN BUSINESS GROUPS 
 
The relationship between diversification and performance has been extensively 
studied by scholars in various disciplines, such as industrial organization (Harberger, 
1954; Lang & Stulz, 1994), strategic management (Bettis, 1981; Christensen & 
Montgomery, 1981; Markides & Williamson, 1994; Rumelt, 1974, 1982) and finance 
(Higgins & Schall, 1975; Lewellen, 1971). Although empirical findings are not universal 
and suggest linear (Gort, 1962; Scherer, 1990), curvilinear (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; 
Rumelt, 1982) and intermediate (Markides, 1992; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988) 
models, the inverted-U relation between diversification and performance has received 
most consistent empirical support.  
In her widely cited paper on diversification and performance, Palepu (1985: 367) 
demonstrates ‘a pattern of declining profitability premiums with increasing diversity’. 
This finding has received substantial support in subsequent studies. For example, 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) find significant performance differences between 
high and low diversifiers. Grant, Jammine and Thomas (1988) show that diversity is 
positively associated with profitability up to a point after which the relationship becomes 
negative. Markides and Williamson (1996) further elaborate the competitive advantages 
of related diversifiers that lead to a superior performance than unrelated ones. Gary (2005) 
shows that extensive related diversification can cause lower performance. Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller (2000: 168) also confirm the inverted-U pattern in the 
diversification-performance linkage through the meta-analysis on 55 quantitative studies 
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based on 82 previous publications. According to the authors, ‘these findings are parallel 
to increasing anecdotal evidence in the business press that firms diversifying outside of 
their core businesses or competencies inherit increased costs that interfere with 
performance’. 
It is worth noting, however, that the studies on diversification-performance 
relationship to date have mainly applied empirical data from developed countries. Table 2 
summarizes the data source of all the 82 studies included in meta-analysis by Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller (2000). With only few exceptions (Chang & Choi, 1988), most of 
these studies have drawn their conclusions based on firms in developed countries such as 
U.S., Canada and U.K. While these studies have significantly contributed to the 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of diversification, such performance 
implication is probably inapplicable to the emerging market context. For example, 
although diversification can minimize unsystematic risks, it is unlikely to reduce 
systematic risk in developed economies. Shareholders can achieve the desired level of 
risks through individual diversification at a lower cost than through organization 
(Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Purkayastha et al., 2012). In the context of emerging 
economies, however, there exist considerable constraints on shareholders’ ability to 
spread risks. As a result, the benefits of diversification will increase as the market 
efficiency and information transparency decrease. 
 The different performance implication of diversification between developed and 
emerging economies has been indicated in several empirical studies. For instance, 
Matsusaka (1993) finds that the performance implication of diversification became 
increasingly negative during the 1960s and the 1980s as the financial institutions 
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developed in the U.S. Through a comparative study on France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and 
U.S., Kogut, Walker amd Anand (2002) identify nation-specific attributes as an important 
determinant of the diversification patterns across these five countries. Furthermore, 
Chakrabarti, Singh and Mahmood (2007) show a negative effect of diversification on 
performance in the more developed institutional environments but a positive effect in the 
least developed ones. 
To conclude, prior studies on the diversification-performance relationship have 
mainly focused on the developed countries (Palich et al., 2000). Given the market power 
advantage of diversificaiton can vary substantively across insitutions, these findings may 
not be readily generalizable to the emerging economies. Therefore, it is important to 
conduct a more careful examination on how diversification influences organization’s 
performance in a weak institutional environment, and how the relationship is modified by 
contingencies such as the mode of diversifications and the extent of family embeddedness. 
The following sections will focus on these aspects using business groups as the empirical 
context.  
-----Insert Table 2 about here----- 
 
5.1 Diversification and Value Creation in Emerging Economies 
The performance implication of diversifications in environment characterized with 
efficient and transparent institutions has been extensively studied in the existing literature. 
Scholars argue that the developed institutions reduce information asymmetry and 
contracting problems, hence lowers the transaction costs in product, labor and capital 
market (Akerlof, 1970; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). Drawing on transaction cost theory, 
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scholars propose that the optimal level of organization’s diversification depends on the 
costs of market transaction and the efficiency of specialized intermediation (Coase, 1937; 
Teece, 1980; Williamson, 1975).  
In the developed institutional environment which previous diversification studies 
have generally applied (Palich et al., 2000), organizations are unlikely to benefit from 
extensive diversifications as those in the emerging economies. As the specialized 
intermediation is well established, the internal intermediaries of diversified organizations 
cannot match the efficiency level of the open market institutions. Highly diversified 
organizations will encounter higher costs and thus lower performance. In other words, the 
efficient markets in developed economies detect and penalize the costs of diversification 
more than the inefficient market in emerging economies (Purkayastha et al., 2010). 
Consistently, empirical studies reveal that although moderate level of diversification 
provides certain benefits to organizations, the costs of diversification will eventually 
offset the benefits as the level of diversification scales up (Gary, 2005; Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1990; Montgomery, 1994; Palich et al., 2000). 
Compared to the developed institutional environment, the emerging economy is 
characterized with institutional voids and market failures. The inadequate disclosure of 
market information and the inefficient regulation of corporate governance will increase 
the difficulties of using the market approach. The absence of intermediaries such as 
venture capitalists, mutual funds and financial analysts will further compound the costs of 
market transactions. Therefore, organizations ‘can be more profitably pursued as part of a 
large diversified business group that can act as an intermediary’ (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000b: 269-270). Business group literature has documented that business groups can 
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substitute the institutional voids through a combination of product, labor and capital 
market intermediation (Khanna & Palepu, 1999b). The coordination mechanisms 
established through intra-group diversifications allow business groups in emerging 
economies to overcome institutional inefficiency and achieve higher financial returns. 
To sum up, the differences in diversification implications between developed and 
emerging economies make it invalid to generalize the previous findings based on the 
former to the latter. On the flip side, the benefits of diversification in emerging 
economies do not come without costs. Business groups cannot fully realize the 
economies of scale and scope from diversification without the proper placement of the 
intra-group coordinating mechanisms (Gerlach, 1992; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Lincoln 
et al., 1996). Neglecting or overemphasizing either the benefits or the costs will lead to a 
misinterpretation of the relationship between diversification and performance. That is 
partly why the diversification-performance relation in business groups remains unclear. 
Some scholars propose diversification reduces systematic risks and enhances business 
group performance in emerging economies (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). In contrast, others 
indicate that the positive effect of diversification can be offset due to the lack of 
management skills and internal processes (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). In the next section, 
I will examine how the diversification decisions (level of diversification and mode of 




5.2 Level of Diversification and Business Group Performance in Emerging 
Economies 
Business groups as a prevalent organizational form in emerging economies have 
commonly used diversifications as an approach to grow. For example, business groups in 
Chile, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines and Thailand generally operate in more than 
two 2-digit industries (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).  
Although scholars have argued that diversification can help business groups 
establish the internal market and lower transaction costs by resource sharing, business 
groups may encounter various challenges when they start to set up the internal market 
and venture into industries that deviate from the core businesses. The costs of 
implementation and coordination will initially offset the benefits from diversification.  
First, business groups usually need to establish an internal market system to achieve 
the economy of scale and scope from diversification. The internal market plays the 
intermediary function and insulates the groups from institutional inefficiency and 
volatility. Previous studies have argued that the internal market enables business groups 
to reduce transaction costs (Leff, 1978; Caves, 1989), obtain monopoly power (Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007), and enhance legitimacy and the probability of survival (Freeman & 
Hannan, 1989). The establishment of the internal market, however, requires substantial 
implementation costs and the benefits are not automatically realized. As the distance 
from the diversified business and the core business begins to increase, business groups 
may need to set up coordination system to solve the problems of communication 
distortion and control loss (Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Mahoney, 1992). In addition, the 
function of internal market may require business groups to excessively purchase 
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specialized assets or to build plants of various scales at adjacent stages of production 
(Daveni & Ravenscraft, 1994). These investments will cause large underutilized capacity 
and sunk costs that business groups with low level of diversification will find difficult to 
justify (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). Previous studies have shown evidences where 
implementation difficulties offset the potential diversification benefits, and the synergy 
initiatives often suffer from diseconomies of scale at the beginning stage of 
diversification (Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Gary, 2005). 
Second, due to the lack of experiences in managing a variety of industries, 
controlling owners of business groups are likely to make suboptimal decisions and invest 
in ventures that are not profitable or strategically beneficial to the existing businesses. 
When business groups start to diversify from their core businesses, they may need to pay 
extra efforts to set up the facilities, search for expertise and business partners, and modify 
the internal governance mechanism. The lack of experience may exacerbate the 
administrative overhead and the cost of production, and thus raise the hazard of failures.  
While costs accrue to diversification in business groups, at some point these efforts 
are also associated with major benefits from the scale and scope of diversification. First, 
business groups can leverage on their reputation and credibility in the established lines of 
businesses for further diversification. The internal market that replicates the intermediary 
institutions in developed economies allows business groups to gain privileged access to 
valuable resources, such as information, licenses and capital financing, which are costly 
to acquire externally in emerging economies (Backman, 1999; Chakrabarti et al., 2007). 
The internal market also enables business groups to engage in predatory pricing and 
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reciprocity in trades, thus enhances their market power and profitability (Datta et al., 
1991; Palepu, 1985).  
Second, a high level of diversification also implies that business groups are likely to 
develop managerial and organizational sophistication to manage the complex structures 
and coordinate across diverse business operations (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). As indicated 
by Khanna and Palepu (2000b), only business groups that develop a large enough pool of 
businesses can capture market opportunities with greater profit potential and achieve net 
benefits from the internal capital and labor market. 
Third, studies drawing on political economy have emphasized the rent-seeking 
perspective of business groups (Granovetter, 1994). The close connections between 
business groups and governments have been documented in many emerging economies, 
such as Korea (Guillen, 2000), India (Encarnation, 1989), China (Keister, 2000; Lu & Ma, 
2008; Yiu et al., 2005), Pakistan (White, 1974), Indonesia (Robison, 1986) and Latin 
America (Granovetter, 1995). Business groups divert resources from real investments 
into political rent seeking in exchange for favors from bureaucrats, judges and politicians 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). The political connections serve as valuable and scarce assets 
that circumvent regulatory impediments and prevent appropriation of group assets. The 
scarcity of such assets implies that business groups with extensive diversification will 
have greater opportunities to use such asset than those less diversified or undiversified 
groups (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). In other words, only those highly diversified business 
groups will disproportionately become the recipients of the political favors and thus 
realize the performance benefits relative to other business groups.  
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Fourth, high level of diversification in business groups reduces risks and serves as 
an insurance function. This is particularly important in the face of volatile and uncertain 
environment (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). The positive implication to business groups is 
exemplified by Li Ka-shing, the controlling owner of the Hutchinson Whampoa group in 
Hong Kong. According to Li, ‘diversification has provided us with varied sources of 
income and has shielded us from the worst of the (Asian) financial crisis’ (Financial 
Times, 1999). Furthermore, business groups with well diversified portfolio usually face 
lower probability of bankruptcy and have higher debt capacity (Datta et al., 1991; Palich 
et al., 2000). As the interest expenses are tax deductible, business groups may enjoy 
reduced taxes as a result of diversification (Palich et al., 2000). 
In sum, business groups in emerging economies will encounter substantial costs 
before they can realize the benefits of diversification. The diversification initiatives may 
involve significant sunk costs. The challenges will be exacerbated with the lack of 
experience to manage and coordinate diversified businesses. As a result, the performance 
of business groups will initially decrease as groups start to diversify from their core 
businesses. The benefits from the economy of scale and scope, however, will gradually 
offset the costs as the level of diversification further increases. The resources such as 
reputation, managerial sophistication and political connections are generic in nature and 
can be applied to diversify profitably across (un)related industries. Diversification in 
various businesses can further reduce risks in unstable environment, allow privileged 





Hypothesis 11 (H11): The relationship between the level of diversification and the 
performance of business groups in emerging economies is not linear, with the slope 
negative at a lower level of diversification but positive at a higher level of diversification.  
 
5.3 Mode of Diversification and Business Group Performance 
The mode of diversification is an important part of business groups’ diversification 
strategy. While numerous studies have addressed the different performance implications 
between the internal approach (typically through greenfield) and the external approach 
(typically through acquisition) (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; Chang & Singh, 1999; Yip, 
1982), there is a lack of attention to the distinction between diversification through new 
firms and diversification through new divisions. As business groups are comprised of a 
collection of legally independent firms (Granovetter, 1995), diversification can be 
pursued by creating a new division inside an existing firm or a new firm that extends the 
group boundary. The choice between these two diversification modes not only alters the 
intra-group structure, but also has significant impact on group performance.  
Previous research on the antecedent of diversification mode has pointed to the 
importance of relatedness between the core business and the new entry. Lee and 
Lieberman (2010) propose that whether the new market is inside or outside the 
organization’s primary business domain determines the choice of diversification mode. 
Yip (1982) proposes that organizations tend to choose internal development for related 
business because the relatedness can reduce the entry barrier and lower the costs of 
diversification. Chatterjee (1990) extends Yip’s study and argues that internal 
development facilitates physical and intangible resource sharing, hence significantly 
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reduces the costs in a related market entry. On the other hand, since the external 
diversification approach involves more redundant resources, it is a less attractive option 
for related diversification.  
The relatedness between the core businesses and the diversifying entrant not only 
influences the approach to diversify but also the organizational performance. I propose 
that business group performance will be better when a related diversification is pursued 
through a new division and when an unrelated diversification is pursued through a new 
firm.  
When business groups diversify into a related industry, the new business is likely to 
build and maintain competitive advantage based on the skills and resources of the groups’ 
existing core business (Porter, 1987). Previous studies find that the diversifying entrant 
will perform better when there is better resource fit between the new business and the 
organization’s other lines of businesses (Chang, 1996; Sharma & Kesner, 1996). Kock 
and Guillén (2001: 82) further argue that related diversification requires more 
organizational integration ‘due to the fact that organizational and technological 
capabilities reside at a lower level in the organization than the capabilities required to 
manage a diversified firm’. Given the substantial requirement of resource transfer and 
organizational synergy from the parent firm to the new business, it will be more efficient 
for the business groups to conduct related diversification through a new division. By 
doing so, business groups are able to manage and communicate with the new business 
entrant (Slangen, 2011), thus achieving organizational synergy and utilizing the group 
resources in a more efficient manner. 
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Drawing on the real option theory, Brouthers and Dikova (2010) suggest that 
diversification with less resource commitment can lower upfront investment and lower 
downsize risks. Compared to establishing a new firm, a new division generally requires 
less initial resource commitment, such as those made in human resources, information 
system or financial structures. Therefore, it allows business groups the flexibility to 
expand when more information and experience about the new business becomes available. 
Business groups will have an option to increase the investment incrementally if the 
diversifying entrant performs, or to defer the diversification if it fails to meet the 
expectations. Due to the lower initial investment in the new division, business groups will 
encounter lower downside risks and switching costs in response to changes. 
Furthermore, previous research has indicated the advantages of using internal funds 
over external funds in the process of diversification. Business groups with more available 
internal funds can avoid the risks of disclosing its plans for diversification and driving up 
the price of the complementary resources. Also, these business groups will face less 
scrutiny by the capital market and fewer constraints regarding the direction of 
diversification (Chatterjee & Singh, 1999). Since diversification through a new division 
requires less initial investment than a new firm, business groups are more likely to be 
able to fund the diversification with their own cash flow. As a result, business groups can 
avoid the costly process of issuing new equity for external funds, remain better control of 
the diversifying entrant and realize better synergy with the existing businesses. 
 
Hypothesis 12 (H12): Business groups will have better performance when the related 
diversification is pursued through a new division rather than a new firm. 
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Previous studies have argued that business groups’ unrelated diversification is a 
result of personal connections, government support or institutional inefficiency. Drawing 
on the case studies of Taiwanese business groups, scholars find that the founders of 
Taiwanese business groups usually initiate unrelated diversifications through their own 
network (Chung, 2006; Hamilton & Kao, 1990). As the personal network is not 
necessarily product specific, the diversification portfolio tends to be idiosyncratic, 
composing unrelated sectors in terms of production, technology and skills (Chung, 2006). 
The locus of the unrelated diversification lies at the level of individual itself rather than 
the level of business groups’ operating units or firms. Therefore, it appears unnecessary 
to incorporate the new business within a group firm and establish a centralized 
organization with a costly head office trying to leverage capabilities that reside deep 
within individual operating units or firms. It will be more beneficial, on the other hand, to 
establish the unrelated diversification through a new firm. The self-contained 
management allows higher autonomy in each business sector without losing the benefits 
of applying the group founders’ critical capability contacts across the group (Kock & 
Guillén, 2001).   
Another rationale for the benefits of pursuing unrelated diversification through a 
new firm is related to the role of government. Previous research has pointed to the 
importance of government intervention in the formation and the development of business 
groups in emerging economies. For example, Chang and Hong (2000) show that the 
Korean government motivated chaebols to enter certain sectors through inducements 
such as cheap loans and tax protections in the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, the 
government policy in China and Taiwan has served as incentives for groups’ continuous 
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expansion in unrelated businesses (Keister, 2000). Following Asian financial crisis, the 
governments in Asian countries (e.g. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand) have enforced group restructuring and the focus on core business. But more 
recently, business groups are now undergoing a ‘second-wave’ of restructuring during 
which international diversification is encouraged by the government in order to respond 
to intensified competitions from foreign multinationals (Chang, 2006). Unrelated 
diversifications as such require complementary resources that are often absent in business 
groups’ existing line of businesses. Therefore, for unrelated diversification, the approach 
of establishing a new firm is less likely to generate resource redundancy compared to 
related diversification. Moreover, as the diversifying entrant is unrelated to business 
groups’ core business, the groups may need to seek for industry-specific resources and 
knowledge externally. The establishment of a new firm, typically those through joint 
venture or acquisition, allows the groups to fill the resource gaps, lay the foundation for 
future expansion, and stretch into the new market with more information and market 
power (Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Lee & Lieberman, 
2010). 
In addition, unrelated diversifications through a new firm add to the network-form 
structure that is commonly observed in business groups (Granovetter, 1995; Khanna & 
Yafeh, 2007; Podolny & Page, 1998). By forming different connections among 
diversified group firms (i.e. buyer-supplier ties, equity ties and interlocking directorate), 
business groups can form an internal market that substitutes the institutional voids in the 
emerging economies. Scholars have demonstrated various advantages of building an 
internal market within business groups, such as reduced transaction costs (Caves, 1989; 
78 
 
Leff, 1978), increased market power through vertical integration (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007), and enhanced legitimacy and the probability of survival (Freeman & Hannan, 
1989). In addition, the intra-group network composed of firms in unrelated businesses 
enforces norms, obligations and reputational bonding among group firms. The 
interactions among group firms intensify the shared experience, knowledge, tacit skills 
and culture among organizations, which in turn, signal legitimacy and trustworthiness to 
the outsiders. Accordingly, business groups can gradually increase the value by pursuing 
unrelated diversifications through new firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). 
 
Hypothesis 13 (H13): Business groups will have better performance when the unrelated 




CHAPTER SIX: INTRODUCTION OF TAIWANESE BUSINESS GROUP 
 
The context of this dissertation is Taiwanese business groups. The earliest official 
documentation of business groups in Taiwan was compiled by China Credit Information 
Service (CCIS), the oldest and the most prestigious credit rating agency, in its biennial 
directory Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT). This directory collects information on the 
top 100 groups (in terms of sales) and it has been widely used in previous studies.  
 
6.1 Why Taiwanese Business Group 
Taiwanese business groups are an ideal context for the purpose of this study for 
three reasons. First, Taiwanese business groups are typically featured with their coherent 
family cultural foundation. Chang (2006) also argues that family-controlled business 
groups are common in East Asia. Hamilton and Kao (1990) use the term ‘inner circle’ to 
refer to the family members involved in the management of Taiwanese business groups 
because of their most powerful positions in the business. Hamilton and Biggart (1988) 
and Chung (2006) find that among the top 100 largest business groups in Taiwan, around 
60 percent are under family domination and the rest are subject to various degree of 
family influence. The presence and the variation of family involvement in Taiwanese 
business groups hence allow me to examine the impact of family on controlling owners’ 
decision of diversification and the consequent performance implications. 
Second, business groups consist of a collection of legally independent firms 
(Granovetter, 1995), which have been regarded as a result of diversifications through new 
firms (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). However, it can be challenging to identify who makes the 
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diversification decisions when the boundary of the business groups is obscure (e.g. 
Japanese keiretsu) (Saxonhouse, 1993; Weinstein & Yafeh, 1995). Compared to business 
groups in other countries, Taiwanese business groups have clearly defined boundary due 
to the deeply rooted cultural foundations such as Chinese familism and social relationship 
(Luo & Chung, 2005). Consistent with the conventional definition of business groups 
(Granovetter, 1995), CCIS defines business groups as ‘a coherent business organization 
including several independent enterprises’. All business groups identified in the BGT 
directory are comprised of at least three legally independent firms, with the core firm 
registered in Taiwan and owned by Taiwanese citizen with over 51 percent 
shareholding2
Third, Taiwan has experienced a significant institutional transition during the time 
period under investigation. Scholars estimate that Taiwan introduced more regulatory 
measures between 1988 and 1993 than in the previous two decades (Cheng & Chu, 2002). 
The changes include deregulation of monopolized industries, privatization of state 
enterprises, large-scale reductions of import control, and liberalization for foreign 
investment and financial market. The large-scale economic transformation and the 
political democratization in Taiwan is typical of many emerging economies, making the 
findings in this study more generalizable (
. 
Peng, 2003). 
                                                          
2 According to BGT, a legally independent firm needs to meet at least one of the following requirements to 
be categorized as the member firm of a business group: 1) The business group acquired the firm with over 
50% direct shareholding or with over 25% cross-shareholding; 2) Over 50% of the assets of the firm and 
the group’s core firm were controlled by the same shareholder; 3) Over half of the firm’s directors, auditors 
and shareholders’ representatives are also serving the same roles in the group’s core firm; 4) Over half of 
the firm’s directors, auditors and shareholders’ representatives have within three-order familial relationship 
with those serving the same roles in the group’s core firm; 5) The firm is under management within the 
group’s administrative system. 
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To summarize, it is the variation of family leadership, the clarity of group boundary 
and the significant institutional development that make Taiwanese business groups 
appropriate to examine the research questions in this dissertation. 
 
6.2 A Brief Description of Taiwanese Business Group 
Originating from the 1950s, business groups have gradually become a legitimized 
and dominant organizational form in Taiwan. Taiwan has witnessed large scale economic 
transformation and deregulation since the mid 1980s, triggered by both internal forces 
such as the political and social conflicts (Wang, 1993) and external forces such as the 
pressure for fair trade practices from the U.S. government (Chu, 1994). In comparison 
with the fast-paced deregulation, the infrastructure establishment was slow and 
fragmented with substantial information asymmetry and underdeveloped corporate 
control (Luo & Chung, 2005). The absence of efficient market institutions has provided 
plenty of opportunities for the business groups (Luo & Chung, 2005). As shown in Table 
3 and Figure 6, business groups have gained significant growth in terms group size 
(number of group firms and employees) and group return. The percentage of GNP 
contributed by business groups has risen from 32.3 percent in 1973 to 53.9 percent in 
1998, demonstrating the significance of Taiwanese business groups to the local economic 
development. 
Figure 7 compares the level of industry development in Taiwan (measured by 
industry product value), the aggregated sales of group core firms, and the aggregated 
number of new firms created by business groups. The steady increase of product value 
across all six industries indicates Taiwan’s gradual growth overtime. Interestingly, 
82 
 
business groups demonstrate different development paths in these industries. For example, 
the product value of the chemical industry in Taiwan grew more than double from 1981 
to 1998, whereas the overall sales by business groups remained stable and the total 
number of group new ventures peaked in 1986. In addition, while the product value and 
the sales of group core firms show similar pace of development in textile and paper 
industries, the number of new businesses created by business groups fluctuated 
substantively. 
A typical example of group growth through diversification is Formosa Plastics 
Group. Founded by Wang Yung-Ching in 1954, Formosa Plastics Group is one of the 
largest and the most successful Taiwanese business groups. Over the years Formosa 
Plastics Group has diversified into industries including biotechnology, petrochemical 
processing, and production of electronics components. Figure 8-1 displays the member 
firms of Formosa Plastics Group and the connections among them before 1980. Formosa 
Plastics Corporation was the core firm around which Wang Yung-Ching formed the 
whole group, and it was central to the group’s petrochemical operations. The 
establishment and buyer-supplier connections among Formosa Plastic Corporation, 
Formosa Chemicals and Fiber Corporation, Nanya Plastics Corporation, and Tai Shih 
Textile Industry Corporation formed a highly vertically integrated internal market. The 
Formosa Plastics Group thus became one of the largest fiber producers in the world.  
In the 1980s, another four new firms, namely Yung Chia Chemical Industries 
Corporation, Formosa Fairway Corporation, PFG Fiber Glass Corporation and Chang 
Gung University, were sequentially created as shown in Figure 8-2. In order to reduce the 
dependence on imports with the rapid development of the electronics and information 
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industries in Taiwan, Formosa Plastics Group started to invest in the basic components of 
the industry, such as the printed circuit boards and copper-clad laminates. Accordingly, 
Nanya Technology Corporation and Nanya Printed Circuited Board Corporation were 
established and successfully integrated with the Nanya Plastics Corporation in the 1990s 
(Figure 8-3). These diversification investments not only largely expanded the Formosa 
Plastics Group’s territory, but also greatly contributed to the self-sufficiency of Taiwan’s 
electronics and information industries. In addition, Formosa Petrochemical Corporation 
was founded in 1992 as a response to Taiwan’s chronic shortage of upstream 
petrochemical materials. The operational coordination between Formosa Petrochemical 
Corporation and the petrochemical related group member firms has greatly reduced the 
reliance on expensive imports and has enhanced the group’s competitiveness in the 
international market. 
To summarize, business groups in Taiwan has undergone substantial growth during 
the past decades. The diversifications by Taiwanese business groups serve as an engine 
for the expansion of the group business and the development of Taiwan’s economy.  
-----Insert Table 3, Figure 6, 7 and 8 about here----- 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
The analysis undertaken in this thesis is based on the top 100 Taiwanese business 
groups over the 1980 to 2000 period. The primary data source is the biennial directory 
Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT), compiled by the oldest and the most prestigious 
credit rating agency China Credit Information Service (CCIS). The second archival 
source is Taiwan Economic Journal, which has been recognized as another authoritative 
and reliable data source in Taiwan. The information reported in these two data sources is 
combined to create the longitudinal profile of Taiwanese business groups necessary to 
test the hypotheses. 
This chapter describes the research design and method that have been conducted. 
Section 7.1 provides detailed information on all variables developed for this dissertation. 
Section 7.2 describes the modeling procedures for the test of the above hypotheses. 
 
7.1 Measure 
This dissertation examines diversification decisions and its performance 
implications in business groups in emerging economies. The unit of analysis is 
group-year and the dependent variables are the level of diversification and the business 
group performance. When the dependent variable is the mode of diversification, the unit 
of analysis is each diversification decision.  
When investigating the determinants of diversification decisions in business groups, 
the main independent variables are controlling owners’ family embeddedness (i.e. the 
number of total family members, the number of second-generation family members, 
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generation and education background). When investigating the determinants of business 
group performance, the main independent variables are the level of group diversifications 
and the mode of group diversification. 
Time lag is applied to all time-variant independent variables and control variables. 
A log transformation is employed to measure variables with abnormal distributions. The 
log transformation brings the data distribution closer to normality. This is desirable 
because of the normality assumption in t-tests which the inferential procedures are based 
on (Greene, 2012). Moreover, the log transformation makes the results easier to interpret: 
the changes in the logarithm form represent the percentage change in the original metric.  
 
7.1.1 Dependent variable 
Level of diversification. To measure the level of diversification, I first identify the 
new diversification pursued by each group by manually going through the development 
trajectories documented in the BGT directory. I then categorize the type of diversification 
according to the industry. Since there is no ready-to-use industry coding in the BGT 
directory, the industry of each diversification is hand coded using the SIC scheme 
published by the Taiwanese government in 2006. Two coders independently code the 
industries, with a consistency rate of 0.83. Business histories of the group firms are 
consulted to resolve differences between the two coders. 
Following the previous studies on business groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), I 
measure the level of diversification by counting the number of new industries each 
business group invests in each year. No. of 2-digit diversification is the sum of new 
industry entries by 2-digit SIC code. It captures the level of unrelated diversification by 
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each business group. By the same token, no. of 3-digit diversification and no. of 4-digit 
diversification are calculated based on 3-digit and 4-digit SIC code. The count measure 
allows me to capture the flow of diversification in business groups each year. It allows 
for a more accurate test of the impact of family embeddedness on controlling owners’ 
diversification decisions. 
To check for robustness, I also apply Palepu’s (1985) entropy measure, which is 
conventionally applied to calculate diversification and takes into account the number of 
industries the business group participates in, the proportion of sales from each industrial 
sector, and the relationship between the sectors. Following the previous studies (Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Luo & Chung, 2005), I gauge group unrelated diversification as the entropy 
measure of unrelated diversifications at the group level across 2-digit SIC industry 
groups:  
DU= ∑pi×ln(1/ pi) 
where pi = proportion of sales in 2-digit SIC code i. Likewise, group total 
diversification is calculated with total entropy measure of both unrelated and related 
diversifications at the group level both across and within 4-digit SIC industrial sectors:  
DT= ∑pt×ln(1/ pt) 
where pt = proportion of sales in 4-digit SIC code t. 
Mode of diversification. I measure the mode of diversification with three dummy 
variables. 2-digit diversification mode equals 1 if the focal diversification identified based 
on 2-digit SIC code is operated through a legally independent firm. The variable equals 0 
if the diversification is conducted through a division in an existing group firm. I construct 
3-digit diversification mode and 4-digit diversification mode following the same method. 
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Figure 9 demonstrates the relationship between the level of diversification and the mode 
of diversification. With an increase of unrelated diversification in business groups, there 
is a clear upward trend of the number of diversification through new firms. In comparison, 
the mode of diversification seems to be less relevant with the level of related 
diversification and total diversification in business groups.  
Return on asset (ROA). I use return on asset (ROA) to gauge business group 
performance. It is a conventional measure that has been widely applied in the strategy 
literature. Return on asset reflects business groups’ efficiency of employing the 
organizational assets and thus their profitability. However, since the group performance 
does not change substantially over the years, it is difficult to capture the impact of 
diversification on performance using the first difference model (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). 
An alternative approach is to use the change in performance, but this approach is subject 
to problems of reliability associated with change scores (Bergh & Fairbank, 2002). 
Following the previous studies, I use the log transformation of ROA (Chakrabarti et al., 
2007) in the regression models3
-----Insert Figure 9 about here----- 
.  
 
7.1.2 Independent variable 
Social embeddedness in family. I identify the controlling owner of each business 
group based on the BGT directory. The directory asks group affiliates to name the most 
important decision maker in the group and provide a brief biographical description for 
each controlling owner. There are three general features of business groups’ controlling 
                                                          
3 Given lnY=a+bX, we can have (1/Y)dY=bdX, and b=(dY/Y)/dX. The coefficient b represents the 
proportional change in Y for an infinitely small change in X. 
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owners. First, they are usually the founder or the son of the founder. Second, they are the 
largest individual shareholder of the core firm and other important group affiliates. Third, 
they often serve as the board chairs in those group firms.  
I follow the method applied by Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak and Schoar 
(2008) to capture controlling owners’ level of embeddedness in their family. I construct 
family trees for all business groups in the sample mainly based on the BGT directory. I 
supplement the data by going through articles from various local business magazines and 
newspapers, such as the Wealth Magazine (1974 to 1997). I start the family data from the 
founder of each business group. I then track all direct descendants of the founder 
generation up to the last generation that is currently active in business. I code the founder 
generation as the first generation, the children of the founder generation as the second 
generation, and so on. For each family member, I collect information on their specific 
position in the family tree, gender, their involvement in the family business, and the 
information of their spouse whenever possible. I also obtain information of the education 
and business background of the controlling owner in each business group as identified by 
the BGT directory.  
I use two variables to measure controlling owners’ social embeddedness in family 
institution: family size and 2nd generation family size. Family size is the sum of family 
members in the family tree, including the spouses. 2nd generation family size is a subset 
of family size and it is calculated by the number of sons and daughters of the controlling 
owner. 
Cognitive embeddedness in family. I use generation and foreign education to 
measure controlling owners’ cognitive embeddedness in family institution. Generation is 
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a dummy variable that equals 0 if the controlling owner is the founder of the business 
group, and 1 otherwise. Since most of the Taiwanese business groups under investigation 
were founded after the 1950s, the majority of the groups are under control either by the 
founders or the second-generation successors (Chung & Luo, 2008a).  
Foreign education. Foreign education is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
controlling owner has experienced foreign education and 0 otherwise. In most cases, the 
foreign education is at the graduate level. 
No. of related diversification through a new division and no. of related 
diversification through a new firm. To examine the impact of the mode of related 
diversification on group performance, I construct no. of related diversification through a 
new division by aggregating the number of 4-digit diversifications through new divisions 
for each group in each year. Likewise I calculate the variable no. of related 
diversification through a new firm by counting the number of 4-digit diversifications 
through new firms. 
No. of unrelated diversification through a new division and no. of unrelated 
diversification through a new firm. To examine the impact of the mode of unrelated 
diversification on group performance, I construct no. of unrelated diversification through 
a new division by aggregating the number of 2-digit diversifications through a new 
division for each group in each year. I gauge the no. of unrelated diversification through 




7.1.3 Control variable 
While my interest centers on the impact of family embeddedness on diversification 
decisions and the performance implications to business groups in emerging economies, I 
include numerous variables that have been found to affect diversification decisions and 
business group performance, including controlling owners’ demographics, group 
resources (e.g. financial conditions, technological resources and political resources), 
industry of operation and institutional development. Such a full set of controls not only 
allow for relatively unbiased estimates, but also afford a comparison of the relative 
predictive power of individual embeddedness analysis versus group-level, industry-level 
and institution-level attributes on diversification decisions and performance outcomes. 
I include two variables for controlling owners’ demographics: control concentration 
and age. I do not include gender variable in the model. This is partly because less than 
two percent of the controlling owners are female, and partly because the other family 
members involved in the business management are mostly male. There are few variations 
in the family members’ functional background. 
Control concentration. Both the agency cost theory and the institutional perspective 
imply that the level of concentrated control will influence the diversification decisions. 
Following the previous studies (Chung & Luo, 2008b), I construct controlling owners’ 
control concentration by calculating the extent to which the control of each business 
group is concentrated to the controlling owner. I gauge control concentration based on 











N is the number of individuals who are board chairs in the member firms of the 
focal business group, and Si is the percentage of board chairs occupied by individual i.  
Age. In addition to the controlling owners’ control concentration, I also control for 
the age of controlling owners. The top management team literature has documented the 
critical role of controlling owners’ age in business management and performance 
(Finkelstein, 1996). Accordingly, I include controlling owners’ age as a control variable 
in the model. I collect this information from the BGT directory, which provides a brief 
biographic description of the controlling owners in each group. 
Pyramidal depth. The pyramidal structure in business groups may influence 
controlling owners’ incentives to tunnel resources at the expense of minority shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). When the pyramidal structure is ‘deep’ enough 
to create subtantial deviation between controlling family’s voting rights and cash flow 
rights, the controlling owners are likely to diversify extensively with limited investment 
from the family, thus maximizing the family welfare. Following Bertrand, Johnson, 
Samphantharak and Schoar (2008), I gauge the pyramidal depth in business groups using 
the largest number of ownership ties among group firms. For instance, if firm A owns 
firm B and firm B owns firm C, I code the pyramidal depth of the group as 2. 
I control for five group-level variables in the model regressions. Debt ratio. Debt 
ratio indicates business groups’ financial conditions. It is calculated by the ratio of group 
debt to group net worth. It is necessary to control for the debt ratio because business 
groups’ diversification decision may depend on their debt burden.  
No. of U.S. patents. I capture business groups’ technological resources with a count 
of U.S. patents that business groups acquire each year. The patent information is 
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collected from the U.S. Patent Office Classification (USPTO). Previous research 
indicates that U.S. patent is a valid measure of technological capability, because U.S. is a 
highly desirable market and firms around the world have the tendency to file their most 
important innovations in this country (Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). 
Political tie. Political tie implies business groups’ government connections, which 
are commonly acknowledged as a valuable resource and an important determinant on 
firm strategy (Faccio et al., 2006). According to Huang (2004), there are ten business 
groups in Taiwan who possess extensive government connections, namely Yuen Foong 
Yu Group, Ruentex Group, Tuntex Group, Shinkong Group, Feng Qun Group, Koo’s 
Group, Formosa Plastics Group, Far Eastern Group, Tatung Group, and Yulon Group. 
Accordingly, political tie is coded as 1 for these ten groups, and 0 otherwise.   
Group age. Prior empirical studies have demonstrated that group age affects group 
strategy and performance, partly because of the increased legitimacy and reliability, and 
partly because of the experience that business groups accumulate overtime (Carroll & 
Delacroix, 1982; Freeman & Hannan, 1989). I control for group age using the year that 
the first group member firm was established.  
Main industry of business group. The importance of industry effect has been 
recognized in strategy research. For example, Dess, Ireland and Hitt (1990: 14) point out 
that ‘the potential for misleading interpretations and alternative plausible explanations 
can result if researchers do not control for possible industry influence’. Consistently, 
other scholars demonstrate that industry typically accounts for over fifteen percent of 
variance in firm performance (Powell, 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988). Given industry as a substantive factor in strategy research, including the main 
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industry of business group helps disclose the unique variance explained by the focal 
independent variables. Following the prior studies, I code the largest proportion of group 
sales by 2-digit SIC code as the main industry participation of the business group. The 
major business lines in Taiwanese business groups include food, textile, wood, chemical, 
metal, nonmetal, electrical/electronics, construction, retail, machinery, financial services 
and real estate. On average, the major business line contributes to over fifty percent of the 
group sales in Taiwan. 
Industry capital cost. Diversification may be a more favorable option in industries 
with lower costs of capital. Likewise, the mode of diversification may be influenced by 
the amount of capital business groups need to invest (Chang & Singh, 1999). Business 
groups are likely to fund the diversification internally and establish the new business 
within the existing firm if the capital cost is low. I control for the capital cost of the 
industry the business group enters using the cost of equity from the CAPM model. 
Following the previous studies (Fama & French, 1997; Hou & Robinson, 2006), the 
capital cost of diversifying entrant for business group i is  
E(Ri) = Rf + βi [E(Rm) – Rf],  
where Rf is the risk-free interest rate, E(Rm) is the expected return on the 
value-weight market portfolio, and βi is the CAPM risk of stock i. 
Institutional development. Previous literature has documented the greatest wave of 
economic liberalization and political democratization in Taiwan in the late 1980s (Luo & 
Chung, 2005). The Taiwanese government was subject to both external (e.g. pressure 
from the U.S. government) and internal forces (e.g. political opposition and social 
movement) for institutional development between 1985 and 1990. During this period, 
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over forty industries were deregulated and policies for the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises were in place (Chu, 2002). The deregulation of foreign exchange rate was 
completed in 1990. Meanwhile, the import controls and tariffs were substantially reduced, 
and foreign institutional investors were allowed to acquire shares in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange. As a result, Taiwan gained significant improvement in market competitiveness 
and became one of the highest-rated countries in 1995 (Luo & Chung, 2005). Based on 
the drastic institutional change before and after 1990, I construct the institutional 
development which equals 0 for the pre-transition era from 1980 to 1990, and 1 for the 
post-transition era. 
 
7.1.4 Data description 
Tables 4 and 5 report the data descriptive of all variables included in this 
dissertation. Table 4 presents the summary statistics. The final sample contains 595 
group-year observations. The statistics of no. of 2-digit diversification is similar to those 
of no. of 3-digit diversification and no. of 4-digit diversification. It suggests that most of 
the diversifications in Taiwanese business groups come from unrelated diversifications. 
This pattern is consistent with the diversifications of the top 30 Korean chaebols between 
1985 to 2000 (Chang & Hong, 2002).  
As shown in Table 5, the family size and 2nd generation family size are negatively 
associated with ROA, suggesting that the reverse causality (i.e. better group performance 
leads to larger family size) is unlikely. The negative correlation between family size and 
control concentration indicates that an increase of family members leads to an increase of 
family involvement in group management, and thus a decline of controlling owners’ 
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power within the business groups. The positive relationship between generation and 
foreign education implies that the successor generation has more opportunities to receive 
foreign generation. Institutional development is negatively associated with the number of 
diversification, indicating that Taiwanese business groups tend to focus on core business 
more after the year 1990. This is probably because diversification as a means to lower 
systematic risks is less desirable as institutions develop. The positive correlation between 
debt ratio and political connection indicates that business groups with government 
connections have more access to external financing.  
-----Insert Table 4 and 5 about here----- 
 
7.2 Modeling Procedure 
7.2.1 Poisson model regression 
The dependent variables for the level of diversification in business groups are count 
variables and take only nonnegative integer values. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
regression approach provides less efficient prediction compared to estimations designed 
for limited dependent variables. Furthermore, OLS regression can yield a negative 
estimation, which is difficult to interpret for count data that is bound from below. Poisson 
regression, on the other hand, is designed for count variables and provides more efficient 
estimation (Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). Poisson regression has 
been commonly used in strategy research involving count data (e.g. Ahuja & Lampert, 
2001; Kogut & Chang, 1991). Accordingly, I specify the Poisson regression model as:  
βA+X
it
1-it1-ite=P γ  
where Pit is the number of diversifications by business group i in year t, Xit-1 is a 
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vector of control variables affecting Pit, and Ait-1 is a vector of explanatory variables for 
the hypothesized effects. I use random effects in the model because of my focus on the 
heterogeneity of diversification decisions across business groups. The Hausman test fails 
to reject random effects in favor of fixed-effects estimators. 
 
7.2.2 Logit model regression  
The dependent variables for the mode of diversification in business groups are 
dummy variables, which equal 1 if the diversification is conducted through a new firm 
and 0 if the diversification is conducted through a new division. I choose to use Logit 
regression, which predicts the likelihood of diversification via a new firm vs. a new 
division. The Logit model has been developed from a theory of probabilistic choice in 
economies (Maddala, 1983) and it has been widely applied to model dichotomous 
choices (Chang & Singh, 1999; Chung et al., 2000; Podolny, 1993). I specify the 
following Logit regression model: 
∑ = ++== Mm AXAXmi iiiiii eeAXYP ,1 )()( /),1( βγβγ  
The model denotes that Yim, the ith diversifying entrant with a particular mode m, is 
a function of explanatory variables (Xi) and control variables (Ai). The coefficients are 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function.  
 
7.2.3 Generalized estimating equations model regression 
The dependent variable for performance is a business group’s return on assets 
(ROA). Since the final sample is a panel data of 429 group-year observations, it is very 
likely that some group-specific characteristics (such as main industry of business group) 
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remain constant over the years. As the observations for the same business group might be 
correlated in the panel data, the assumption of independence across observations 
necessary for ordinary least-square regression may be violated. Therefore, I use the 
maximum likelihood estimation of generalized estimating equations (GEE) to test the 
hypotheses pertaining to business group performance. 
Designed as a generalized linear model, GEE regression allows correlations across 
observations within the subjects in longitudinal studies (Hardin, 2007). It generates 
parameters and standard errors based on an estimated correlation derived from 
within-cluster residuals (Ndofor et al., 2011). Previous research suggests that GEE 
regression allows for ‘all possible correlations between within-subject responses and 
includes them in the estimation of the variances’ and ‘it is the least restrictive in terms of 
modeling the true correlation structure within subject’ (Ballinger, 2004: 133). Therefore, 
GEE regression best matches with the data structure in this study and can produce more 
efficient and accurate estimation. 
In order to test for the robustness of the result, I also employ a cross-sectional time 
series estimation model using the xtreg procedure in Stata. The Hausman fails to reject 
random effects in favor of fixed-effects estimators. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF CONTROLLING OWNERS’ 
FAMILY EMBEDDEDNESS AND DIVERSIFICATION DECISIONS 
 
This chapter presents and examines samples of Taiwanese business groups that 
engage in diversification. I start with the descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the 
Taiwanese business groups. I then move on to the empirical findings of the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 3. This chapter closes with a set of robustness checks conducted to 
test for the sensitivity of the results.  
 
8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 6 presents the family characteristics of the business groups in my sample. The 
average family size is 6 with a maximum of 29, and the majority of group founders are 
male. Table 7 compares the differences between the founder-generation and the 
second-generation controlling owners. The significant differences for various variables 
indicate substantive differences between the two. In general, the founder-generation 
controlling owners are older and have more dominant group control. The 
second-generation have more female controlling owners, higher education and more 
experience of overseas operations.  
----- Insert Table 6 and 7 about here----- 
 
8.2 Hypothesis Testing 
I present the empirical testing results for the level of diversification in Table 8 to 10. 
Since the standard deviation of the dependent variables (no. of 2-digit diversification, no. 
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of 3-digit diversification and no. of 4-digit diversification) is close to the mean, 
displaying no signs of overdispersion, I use Poisson model to address the discrete nature 
of the dependent variables. Model 1 in Table 8 to 10 is the base models with all three 
dependent variables: no. of 2-digit diversification, no. of 3-digit diversification and no. of 
4-digit diversification. I take 1-year lag for all time variant variables. To observe changes 
in the explanatory power, I sequentially add the variables for family embeddedness and 
the interaction terms in Table 8, 9 and 10. The log likelihood shows model improvement 
and none of the signs for the control variables change as I add the independent variables 
in the model. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the level of controlling owners’ embeddedness in the 
family institution will have a positive effect on their propensity of diversification. The 
positive coefficients of family size and 2nd generation family size in Table 8 lend supports 
to the hypothesis. The result is consistent when the level of diversification is calculated 
based on 3-digit and 4-digit SIC codes (Table 9 and 10). To correctly interpret the 
coefficient in non-linear model, I follow the practice suggested by Hoetker (2007). 
Keeping other variables at their mean value, I demonstrate the impact of family 
embeddedness in Figure 10 using the spostado package in Stata10. The upward trend is 
consistent for both measures of family embeddedness.  
It is worth noting that the coefficients of 2nd generation family size in Models 4 and 
5 are larger than those of family size in Models 2 and 3 in Table 8. Such coefficient 
differences remain when I use 3-digit and 4-digit diversification as the dependent 
variables (Table 9 and 10). Consistently, as shown in Figure 10, the marginal effect of 2nd 
generation family size on no. of 4-digit diversification is larger than that of family size. It 
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suggests that the number of family members in the second generation serves as a stronger 
institutional force on controlling owners’ diversification decisions. Since the norms of 
inheritance, legacy preservation and reliance on insiders have all emphasized the business 
succession from the founder generation to the later generation, controlling owners’ 
imperatives to primarily serve the family interests should be higher when they develop 
strong ties with family members of the successor generations. This result further confirms 
my argument that controlling owners’ strategic decisions vary according to their 
embeddedness in social institutions.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relationship between the generation of controlling 
owners and their propensity of diversification. The negative and significant coefficients 
of generation in Table 8 have confirmed the argument. The signs of the coefficients stay 
consistent in Table 9 and 10, where the dependent variables are the number of 3-digt and 
4-digit diversifications respectively. 
Hypothesis 5 posits that controlling owners with foreign education are less likely to 
diversify. Consistent with my argument, the coefficients of foreign education in Table 8 
to 10 are negative and significant.  
I use Logit model to test hypothesis 2, which predicts a positive impact of social 
embeddedness on controlling owners’ decision of diversification mode. The positive 
coefficients of family size and 2nd generation family size (Table 11, 12 and 13) and the 
upward slopes of these two variables (Figure 11) have confirmed the argument that 
controlling owners with higher social embeddedness in family institutions are more likely 
to diversify through legally separated firms. Similar with the results of diversification 
level, the coefficients of 2nd generation family size are larger than those of family size 
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(Table 12 and 13). The coefficient differences of these two variables suggest that the ties 
with successor generations will impose higher imperatives on controlling owners to 
conform to familial norms than the ties with other family members.  
Hypothesis 4, which proposes a negative relationship between the generation of 
controlling owners and the preference to diversify through a new firm, is supported. The 
coefficients of generation are negative and significant in all models in Table 11, 12 and 
13. 
In Hypothesis 6, I propose for a negative relationship between controlling owners’ 
experience of foreign education and their propensity of using the new firm approach to 
diversify. However, this hypothesis is not supported. The coefficients of foreign 
education are insignificant.  
----- Insert Table 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, Figure 10 and 11 about here----- 
 
8.3 Robustness Check 
I conduct a set of sensitivity analyses to test the result robustness. First, I construct 
non-family member by counting the number of non-family members who are in the ‘inner 
circle’ of the business groups. This measure captures the counter-effect of controlling 
owners’ embeddedness in the family institution (Hamilton & Kao, 1990). When the 
controlling owners have more connections with non-family members in the business 
groups, they are less likely to be predominated by the familial norms and thus are less 
likely to bind their self-interest primarily with the interests of the family. Accordingly, I 
expect negative (or less positive) effects of the number of non-family members on 
controlling owners’ propensity of diversification and their propensity of diversification 
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through new firms. The regression results show negative and significant coefficients of 
non-family members, and thus lend supports to my theoretical argument.  
Second, to demonstrate the norm of inheritance, I create a dummy variable gender 
of 1st born (0 if female and 1 if male) to indicate the gender of the first born child by the 
group founder. According to the Chinese familism culture, male offspring are more 
desirable as they are usually considered as the heirs of the family property and the 
successor of the family business (Wong, 1985). If the norm of inheritance holds true, the 
group founders will tend to have more children if the first born child is a daughter, in the 
hope of having a son or sons among the later born. In the case where the founder’s wife 
cannot give birth or cannot give birth to sons, the founder may have concubines to ensure 
the sustainability of the family legacy. Accordingly, the gender of 1st born should be 
negatively related to family size and the number of wives the founder has. The significant 
and negative correlations (-0.13 and -0.05) in the sample confirm the argument.  
Third, the size of the family may be a result of business group performance or 
demographics of the controlling owners. It is important, therefore, to test my analyses for 
endogeneity. I employ the Heckman two-stage model which first regresses the variables 
of family embeddedness, family size and 2nd generation family size, against a set of 
independent variables (education, age, generation, ROA and institutional development) to 
generate an instrument. I then include the instrumental variable in regressions with the 
level of diversification and the mode of diversification as dependent variables. The 
instrumental variable corrects for omitted variable bias in the second regression (Greene, 
2012). The coefficients of lambdas are insignificant, showing no indications of 
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endogeneity in the original analyses. The adjusted results corresponded closely to the 
results reported in Table 8 to 13. 
Fourth, I distinguish social embeddedness from cognitive embeddedness and 
demonstrate their respective impacts on controlling owners’ diversification decisions. 
Following my argument, controlling owners’ propensity to pursue diversification and to 
use the new firm approach to diversify should be strongest when they have high level of 
social embeddedness and high level of cognitive embeddedness. The interaction between 
these two variables lends support to my argument. 
Fifth, in addition to the count measure of the level of diversification, I construct 
alternative variables for group diversification. Palepu’s (1985) entropy measure is 
conventionally applied to calculate diversification and it takes into account the number of 
industrial sectors the business groups participate in, the proportion of sales from each 
sector, and the relationship between the sectors. Accordingly, I gauge group unrelated 
diversification as the entropy measure of 2-digit SIC industry sectors at the group level, 
and group total diversification as the entropy measure of both across and within 2-digit 
SIC industry sectors at the group level. Furthermore, I change all three dependent 
variables into dummy variables. The no. of 2-digit diversification dummy equals 0 if the 
business group has not pursued any 2-digit diversification in the focal year and 1 
otherwise. I construct no. of 3-digit diversification dummy and no. of 4-digit 
diversification dummy following the same method. The results stay consistent using these 
alternative variables.  
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CHAPTER NINE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF CONTINGENT EFFECT ON 
DIVERSIFICATION DECISIONS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the empirical analysis of the contingent effect in 
the relationship between controlling owners’ embeddedness in family and their 
diversification decisions in business groups. Figure 12 demonstrates the relationship 
between controlling owners’ family size and the level of their concentrated control in 
business groups. As the family size increases, the average control concentration gradually 
decreases. The downward trend suggests when the controlling owners have a larger 
family, more family members are likely to involve in the managerial decision makings. 
Consequently, controlling owners’ individual power within the group will be reduced.  
Figure 13 displays the average number of 4-digit diversifications and the average 
number of group firms between 1981 and 2000. The average number of diversifications 
significantly increases until 1990, after which there appears to be a downward trend in 
business groups’ propensity to diversify. It lends support to the use of year 1990 as an 
indicator for institutional development. 
-----Insert Figure 12 and 13 about here----- 
 
9.1 Contingent Effect of Control Concentration 
I present the empirical testing results for the contingent effect of control 
concentration on the level of diversification in Table 15 to 17. Following the method used 
in Chapter 8, I apply Poisson regression model to the proposed relationships. Model 1 in 
Table 15 to 17 is the base models with all three dependent variables: no. of 2-digit 
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diversification, no. of 3-digit diversification and no. of 4-digit diversification. I take 
1-year lag for all time variant variables. To observe changes in the explanatory power, I 
sequentially add the interaction terms in Table 15 to 17. The log likelihood shows model 
improvement and none of the signs for the control variables change as I add the 
interactions in the model. 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that the positive effects of controlling owners’ social 
embeddedness in family on the level of diversification in business groups will be 
strengthened with a higher level of control concentration. The positive coefficients of the 
interaction between family size and control concentration, and the interaction between 2nd 
generation family size and control concentration in Table 15 lend supports to the 
hypothesis. The result is consistent when the level of diversification calculated based on 
3-digit and 4-digit SIC codes (Table 16 and 17).  
Figure 14 demonstrates the moderating effect of control concentration based on 
Model 4 in Table 17. Keeping other variables constant, I plot the relationships between 
family size and no. of 4-digit diversification using different level of control concentration. 
The steeper slope for high control concentration (1 standard deviation above the mean) 
conforms to my prediction of a positive moderating effect in Hypothesis 7.  
I propose a positive moderating effect of controlling owners’ control concentration 
on the relationship between their social embeddedness and the mode of diversification in 
business groups in Hypothesis 8. Table 18 to 20 present the Logit model predications 
where the dependent variables are the mode of 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit diversification 
respectively. The positive and significant coefficients of the interaction between family 
size and control concentration, and the interaction between 2nd generation family size and 
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control concentration in Table 18 lend supports to the hypothesis. The significant and 
positive coefficients remain in Table 19 and 20. 
Figure 15 displays the moderating effect of control concentration based on Model 4 
in Table 20. Keeping other variables constant, I plot the relationships between family size 
and the probability to pursue 4-digit diversification through a new firm using different 
level of control concentration. While controlling owners with a high level of control 
concentration (1 standard deviation above the mean) are more likely to pursue 
diversification through a new firm, there appears to be a downward slope when the 
control concentration is low (1 standard deviation below the mean). The proposed 
positive moderating effect of control concentration is thus supported.  
-----Insert Table 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, Figure 14 and 15 about here----- 
 
9.2 Contingent Effect of Institutional Development  
Hypothesis 9 posits that the impact of controlling owners’ social embeddedness on 
the level of diversification will be weakened as the institution develops. In order to test 
the hypothesis, I construct an interaction between the social embeddedness in family 
(family size and 2nd generation family size) and the institutional development. Model 3, 4, 
7 and 8 in Table 15 present the Poisson regression results of the moderating effect of 
institutional development on the relationship between controlling owners’ social 
embeddedness in family and their likelihood to diversify. The negative and significant 
coefficients confirm the hypothesis. Consistently, regressions on the no. of 3-digit 
diversification (Table 16) and the no. of 4-digit diversification (Table 17) demonstrate 
similar results.  
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Figure 16 shows the result interpretation of the full model (Model 4) in Table 17. 
The upward slope for lower level of institutional development (before year 1990) and the 
downward slope for higher level of institutional development (after year 1990) conform 
to my argument. The institutional voids in emerging economies initially allow the 
controlling owners to use diversification as an approach to maximize their family 
interests. As the market becomes more transparent and efficient, controlling owners will 
face more constraints in using diversification to serve their family welfare, especially at 
the expense of other stakeholders. In order to change the ‘self-serving’ image and 
preserve the legacy and reputation of the family businesses, controlling owners may 
purposefully reduce diversifications as a signal for legal and trustworthy corporate 
practice. 
I propose that the level of institutional development will mitigate the positive effect 
of family embeddedness on the likelihood of diversification through new firms in 
Hypothesis 10. I include the interaction between family size and institutional development, 
and the interaction between 2nd generation family size and institutional development in 
the Logit regression models in Table 18 to 20. However, the hypothesis is not supported. 
The signs of the interaction coefficients are positive and insignificant.  
-----Figure 16 about here----- 
 
9.3 Robustness Check 
I conduct a set of sensitivity analyses to test the result robustness. First, I construct 
alternative variables to measure the level of group diversification. Palepu’s (1985) 
entropy measure is conventionally applied to calculate diversification. The entropy 
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measure takes into account the number of industrial sectors the business groups 
participate in, the proportion of sales from each sector, and the relationship between the 
sectors. Accordingly, I gauge group unrelated diversification as the entropy measure of 
2-digit SIC industry sectors at the group level, and group total diversification as the 
entropy measure of both across and within 2-digit SIC industry sectors at the group level. 
The results stay consistent.  
Second, I change all three dependent variables into dummy variables. The no. of 
2-digit diversification dummy equals 0 if the business group has not pursued any 2-digit 
diversification in the focal year and 1 otherwise. I construct no. of 3-digit diversification 
dummy and no. of 4-digit diversification dummy following the same rule. The results stay 
consistent using these alternative variables. 
 Last, I construct a variable non-family member, which is the number of non-family 
members in the ‘inner circle’ of the business groups, to indicate the counter-effect of 
controlling owners’ embeddedness in the family institution (Hamilton & Kao, 1990). I 
expect consistent contingent effects of control concentration and institutional 
development on controlling owners’ diversification decisions. The regression results lend 
supports to my theoretical argument. 
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CHAPTER TEN: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF PERFORMANCE IMPLICATION 
OF DIVERSIFICATION DECISIONS 
 
I will focus on the empirical findings on the performance implication of 
diversification decisions in Taiwanese business groups in this chapter. The final dataset 
consists of 429 group-year observations. Although I count for a collection of time variant 
variables, there are variables such as family size and main industry in business group that 
remain constant across the years. The possible correlations across observations violate the 
assumption of independence across observations in ordinary least squares regressions. 
Therefore, I use the maximum likelihood estimation of generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) to test the hypotheses on performance implications of diversifications in business 
groups. According to the previous studies, GEE model regression provides multiple 
correlation matrix structures to best match the data. It allows ‘all possible correlations 
between within-subject responses and includes them in the estimation of the variances’ 
(Ndofor et al., 2011: 650).  
 
10.1 Level of Diversification and Business Group Performance 
I present the empirical testing results for the performance of business groups in 
Table 21. I employ GEE model to test the effects of diversification decisions on business 
group performance. Model 1 is the base model with all the control variables. I take 1-year 
lag for all time variant variables. To observe changes in the explanatory power, I 
sequentially add the independent variables in the models. The Wald chi-square 
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demonstrates model improvement and none of the signs for the control variables change 
as I add the independent variables in the models. 
I predict a curvilinear relationship between the level of diversification and the 
business group performance in Hypothesis 11. I add the linear term of total 
diversification in Model 2 and that of unrelated diversification in Model 6 (Table 21). 
Neither of them is significant. I then add the square term of total diversification in Model 
3 and unrelated diversification in Model 7. Both the linear term and the square term turn 
significant. The signs of the coefficients are consistent with Hypothesis 11. 
Figure 17 displays the curvilinear relationship based on the full model (Model 4) in 
Table 21. Keeping other variables constant, I plot the relationships between total 
diversification and group ROA. As proposed in Hypothesis 11, the performance of 
business groups initially declines as the total group diversification increases. After the 
threshold, the group performance starts to improve with a higher level of total 
diversification.  
 
10.2 Mode of Diversification and Business Group Performance 
Hypothesis 12 posits that business groups will perform better when controlling 
owners pursue related diversifications through a new division than a new firm. To test the 
hypothesis, I add the no. of related diversification through a new division and the no. of 
related diversification through a new firm in Model 4 and 8 in Table 21. The Wald 
chi-square shows model improvement as I add the variables in the model. The 
coefficients of no. of related diversification through a new division are positive and 
significant, and the coefficients of no. of related diversification through a new firm are 
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negative and insignificant. Therefore, the coefficient differences lend support to my 
argument.  
In Hypothesis 13, I propose that the pursuit of unrelated diversification through a 
new firm will lead to better business group performance than that through a new division. 
I add the variables no. of unrelated diversification through a new division and no. of 
unrelated diversification through a new firm in Model 5 and 9 in Table 21. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, the results suggest that business groups will have better performance 
when the unrelated diversification is conducted through a new division. The negative 
coefficients of no. of unrelated diversification through a new firm challenge the 
conventional wisdom that unrelated diversifications pursued in the form of business 
groups in emerging economies can reduce transaction costs and benefit shareholders. In 
contrast with such positive predictions, the findings suggest that unrelated diversification 
through new firms can be harmful, probably because it is driven by motivations such as 
family empire building or risk aversion (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).   
-----Insert Table 21 and Figure 17 about here----- 
 
10.3 Robustness Check 
I conduct a set of sensitivity analyses to test the result robustness. First, following 
the previous studies, I construct alternative variables to measure the level of 
diversification. I count the number of different industries by 2-digit SIC code that the 
business group is involved in and use it as the independent variable to test for the 
curvilinear relationship between the level of diversification and the business group 
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performance (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; 2000c). The regressions show consistent results 
and thus support my theoretical argument. 
Second, I employ a cross-sectional time series estimation model using the xtreg 
procedure in Stata to test the hypotheses. The Hausman test fails to reject random effects 
in favor of fixed-effects estimators. The regression results are similar to the findings of 
the GEE model. As proposed in Hypothesis 11, total diversification and unrelated 
diversification both have a U-shaped relationship with the business group performance. 
The coefficients of no. of related diversification through a new division are positive and 
significant, lending support to Hypothesis 12. 
Third, I divide the no. of related diversification through a new division by the sum 
of no. of related diversification through a new division and the no. of related 
diversification through a new firm. I then obtain a percentage measure: the percentage of 
related diversification through a new division. This variable should have a positive effect 
on group performance if Hypothesis 11 holds. As expected, the regression coefficient is 
positive and significant.  
Fourth, I find a negative effect of total diversification and unrelated diversification, 
and a positive effect of their square terms in the subsamples before and after the year 
1990, during which drastic institutional change in Taiwan has been documented. This 
result suggests that the curvilinear relationship between the level of diversification and 
the group performance stays robust even when the institution changes significantly. The 
effects of the mode of related diversification on group performance in the subsamples 
also conform to my hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
11.1 Key Finding 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to examine how the invisible hands of 
family affect the diversification decisions in business groups in emerging economies, and 
how such diversification decisions influence business groups’ performance. I use 
Taiwanese business groups during 1980 to 2000 as the empirical context to analyze the 
underlying relationships.  
While the current literature on the antecedents of diversification has largely drawn 
on the agency theory and the context of public-owned organizations, I consider 
diversification in business groups as controlling owners’ responses to pursue family 
interests (the maximization of family welfare). I propose and demonstrate that when 
controlling owners are highly embedded in the family, they will perceive the family 
welfare as their priority and tend to serve the familial norms such as inheritance and 
conflict avoidance, legacy preservation and reliance on family social capital. These 
familial considerations will motivate controlling owners of business groups to diversify 
more, and to diversify via a new firm rather than a new division.  
In modeling the relationship between controlling owners’ family embeddedness and 
business groups’ diversification decisions, I also investigate the contingent effects of the 
level of control concentration and the level of institutional development. The results 
highlight that the controlling owners can better align their primary interests with the 
diversification decisions when they have more concentrated control in business groups. 
Meanwhile, I find that the positive association between controlling owners’ family 
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embeddedness and the level of diversifications is mitigated as the institutional 
environment develops. However, the proposed contingent effect of institutional 
development on the mode of diversification is not supported. 
The performance implication of controlling owners’ diversification decisions is 
another focus of this dissertation. I theorize and test for a U-shaped relationship between 
the level of diversification and the business group performance. I show that business 
groups’ performance declines at the initial stage of diversification. After a certain 
threshold, however, higher level of diversification will lead to better group performance. 
Furthermore, I find that the mode of diversification matters. For both related and 
unrelated diversification, business groups will gain better performance when using the 
new division approach rather than the new firm approach. 
Table 23 summarizes the empirical results of the hypotheses in this dissertation. 
Overall, the results provide reasonable support for the hypotheses. 
-----Insert Table 23 about here----- 
 
11.2 Implication and Contribution 
The inter-disciplinary nature of the study implies that there is potential to draw 
implications for multiple academic literatures. In general, this research contributes to the 
strategy literature by examining the antecedents and the performance implications of 
diversifications in emerging economies. Within the broad strategy literature, this study 
extends the research in business groups, diversification, family business and emerging 
economies. The section below elaborates the contributions to each literature and 
discusses the managerial implications of the findings. 
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11.2.1 Literature of business group 
Business groups are known to grow in the form of diversification (Chang & Choi, 
1988; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). A core question in business group literature is why and 
how business groups emerge and persist through diversifications (Gerlach, 1992; Khanna 
& Palepu, 2000b; Lincoln et al., 1996). Scholars have attributed the emergence of 
business groups to institutional inefficiency (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 
2000b; Leff, 1978), government intervention (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988; Keister, 2004) 
and organizational resources (Gerlach, 1992; Guillen, 2000; Kock & Guillén, 2001). 
However, previous studies tend to compare business groups with other organizational 
forms (e.g. independent firms) and overlook the heterogeneity across business groups. 
Moreover, previous studies tend to apply a static approach and fail to account for why 
and how business groups persist overtime. As commented by Hamilton and Biggart 
(1988: 66-67), the ‘growth of large business groups in Taiwan cannot be explained by 
either transaction-cost reduction or market uncertainty’. By investigating the role of 
family on business groups’ continuous expansion, I offer another explanation that help 
address both limitations. Using a twenty-year longitudinal data, I demonstrate a path 
through which family business groups can evolve from individual entrepreneurs, to larger 
family-owned entities, and eventually to diversified business groups. This study sheds 
light on the extent to which considerations of family welfare influence the growth of 
business groups in emerging economies. 
Another contribution to the business group literature lies in its investigation of the 
costs from building the intra-group internal market. Previous research tends to highlight 
the benefits of the intra-group internal market, such as substituting the inefficient 
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institutions and lowering the transaction costs (Caves, 1989; Chang & Hong, 2000; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978). The establishment costs of such internal market, 
however, are often overlooked. In this dissertation, I propose and demonstrate that 
business groups will incur substantial costs at the initial stage of diversification and 
internal market establishment. The benefits will outweigh the costs only when business 
groups start to achieve significant economy of scale and scope. By doing so, I contribute 
to the current literature by manifesting when and why diversification in business groups 
improves performance. 
Furthermore, I use a different approach to study the diversification-performance 
relationship in business groups in this dissertation. In the literature of business group, 
with only a few exceptions (Chang & Hong, 2002; Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & 
Mitchell, 2004), evidence on business group performance has largely been drawn from 
studies at the firm level rather than the group level (Carney et al., 2011). The lack of 
group-level empirical studies is of concern, because the main theoretical studies have 
generally analyzed business groups’ superior performance from the prospect of 
aggregated economy of scale and scope. For instance, the performance advantages of 
business groups are proposed as a function of their market power, political connections 
and ability to mimic market institutions (Claessens et al., 2000; Morck et al., 2005; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1999). In business group literature, there appears to be a disconnection 
between theories on the group-level and empirical studies on the firm-level (Carney et al., 
2011). I summarize the empirical studies on diversification, performance and business 
group in Table 1. These studies generally focus on the role of group affiliation on the 
diversification-performance relationship and are mostly conducted at the firm level. 
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While the empirical findings have provided insights to the business group literature, the 
linkage between group diversification and group performance seems to be missing. 
Therefore, my approach to test the diversification-performance relationship via the 
group-level empirical analysis helps address this limitation in the business group 
literature. 
-----Insert Table 1 about here----- 
 
11.2.2 Literature of diversification  
This study contributes to the literature of diversification by proposing a U-shaped 
relationship between the degree of diversification and business group performance. The 
current literature on the diversification and performance has emphasized the costs of 
extensive diversification and argued that moderate level of diversification leads to 
optimal organizational performance (Gary, 2005; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Montgomery, 
1994; Palich et al., 2000). However, the inverted-U relationship between the extent of 
diversification and the organizational performance has been challenged in recent studies 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Kogut et al., 2002; Matsusaka, 1993). In this dissertation, I 
point out that the lack of coherent findings is probably due to the overemphasis of the 
developed countries as the empirical contexts. Since the institutional environments are 
substantially different between developed and emerging economies, the analyses based 
on the former may not be readily generalizable to the latter. 
To advance the understanding of the diversification-performance relationship in 
emerging economies, I focus on business groups, one of the most important 
organizational forms in emerging economies, and analyze the costs and benefits 
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corresponding to various levels of diversifications. I argue that in developed economies 
where the specialized intermediation is well established, the benefits of diversification 
can be eventually offset by the costs of establishing and maintaining the internal 
mechanism. Organizations will find it more beneficial to opt for the market approach 
rather than the diversification approach.  
In contrast, I propose that the absence of specialized intermediation in emerging 
economies provides a major advantage for business groups with extensive 
diversifications. By establishing an internal market through diversification, business 
groups can effectively substitute the institutional voids and lower the transaction costs. At 
the beginning of the diversification, business groups are subject to the costs of 
establishing the internal coordination mechanism, such as solving problems of 
communication distortion and control loss, purchasing specialized assets and resources, 
and making suboptimal decisions due to the lack of experiences. However, the costs of 
establishing the internal market will be eventually offset by the benefits. When the 
diversification reaches a certain scale and scope, business groups can leverage their 
tangible and intangible resources for further diversifications, which in turn translate into 
better financial performance.  
In addition, existing research on the mode of diversifying entrant has commonly 
adopted the resource-based view and the transaction cost theory (Chatterjee & Singh, 
1999). Despite the emphasis on these two perspectives, their impacts on the decision of 
diversification mode have received inadequate empirical supports (Busija et al., 1997; 
Chatterjee, 1990; Chatterjee & Singh, 1999; Yip, 1982). In this dissertation, I propose 
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another explanation for the choice of diversification mode: controlling owners’ incentives 
to conform to institutional norms.  
Moreover, the focus of the diversification mode has been mostly placed on firm’s 
geographical expansion or the choice between acquisition and greenfield start-ups 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Hennart & Park, 1993). Little is known, however, on 
when and why diversification is pursued via the legally independent firms rather than the 
freestanding conglomerate. In this dissertation, I demonstrate that diversification through 
a new firm can be an approach for the controlling owners to obtain control and 
manipulate resource distribution for the benefits of the controlling family. 
 
11.2.3 Literature of family business 
The family influence on organizational performance has been a central debate in the 
family business literature. In this dissertation, I advance the understanding of the invisible 
hand of family by showing that with similar family ownership and control, controlling 
owners’ propensity to purse family interests can vary, depending on their level of 
embeddedness in family institution. The examination of family influence from a more 
fine-grained institutional embeddedness perspective unpack the mechanism that might 
have be overlooked by prior studies, which assume homogeneity across family businesses 
and focus on the comparisons between family businesses and non-family businesses. The 
study helps reconcile previous ambiguous findings on diversification strategies in family 
businesses. It also points to the need for a more careful and systematic examination of the 
impact of family dynamics on organizational decisions.  
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Furthermore, since Amihud and Lev’s (1981) landmark study on the managerial 
motives for diversification, extensive studies have drawn on the agency theory and 
considered diversification as a result of managers’ pursuit for their economic wealth. 
While the economic considerations are significant determinants of diversification, this 
line of research assumes that self-interest is unidimensional and overlooks the importance 
of non-economic considerations. According to Khanna and Palepu (2000a: 271), ‘goals 
like institutional legitimacy, political power, and social fitness may be as important for 
business groups as economic considerations…To the extent that business groups coexist 
with numerous social relationships, behavior within the groups may be governed by 
norms that have little to do with economic costs and benefits…’.  
The findings in this study suggest that controlling owners’ self-interest is 
multi-dimensional and their motives to diversify are contingent on their level of 
embeddedness in different institutions. The association between the level of 
embeddedness in family and the propensity to pursue family interests modifies the 
conventional assumption that self-interest is unidimensional. When controlling owners 
diversify for the family welfare, it can be considered as their pursuit of non-economic 
goals. The finding that the diversification decisions driven by family considerations (i.e. 
the preference to diversify through a new firm) lead to worse group performance is a 
reflection of the emphasis on non-economic interests rather than the economic return. By 
incorporating institutional theory and social embeddedness perspective, this study 
advances the understanding of controlling owners’ decision making process. As noted by 
Eisenhardt (1989: 72), ‘the institutional emphasis on tradition complements the efficiency 
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emphasis of agency theory’, and the result is a better understanding of decision makers’ 
behavioral preferences. 
The above findings further conform to the social identity theory (Turner, 1975). 
According to the social identity theory, individuals generally have multiple social 
identities, which can conflict with each other and generate adverse performance 
consequences (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). This study shows that the hierarchy of 
individuals’ social identities is a function of their social relations. It is the salient social 
identity that dominates individuals’ decision making, in this study, the diversification 
decisions in business groups.  
 
11.2.4 Literature of emerging economies 
This dissertation showcases a typical rationale for diversification by family 
businesses in emerging economies. The significant findings based on Taiwanese business 
groups over a 20-year period (1980 to 2000) suggest that the family values remain fairly 
robust despite the drastic institutional changes in emerging economies, at least in the 
short or medium run. This result is consistent with Bertrand and Schoar’s (2006: 89-90) 
study on the changes in family values across 19 countries over a 20-year time window. 
According to the authors, certain ‘family values prove to be remarkably stable over these 
20- and 10-year time frames, even among developing countries that have experienced 
very rapid growth’.  
In fact, diversified family businesses in emerging economies have recently been 
recognized as ‘a new kind of global company on the rise…(that) have challenged some of 
the West’s most cherished notions of how companies ought to organize themselves’ 
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(Economist, 2011). This phenomenon in the East may contradict the common practice in 
the West. Recent research has shown a systematic association between the institutional 
efficiency and the impact of family ownership and control on firm value (Peng & Jiang, 
2010). In the West with more developed institutions, the incentive of controlling owners 
can be less important since the internal mechanism in family business can be partially 
substituted by the more efficient legal and regulatory institutions (Heugens et al., 2009). 
For example, drawing on a sample of Canadian family businesses, Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma (1999) find that family involvement is a very week indicator of controlling 
family’s concern over succession and professionalization. By demonstrating the unique 
practices in family businesses in emerging economies, this study provides some 
implications for scholars and practitioners from the West. Given the importance of 
diversified family businesses in emerging markets, Western organizations may need to 
collaborate with these ‘old-fashioned’ organizations and even to embrace diversification 
as they enter and compete in the fast-growing emerging markets.  
  
11.3 Limitation and Future Research 
While this dissertation has made some contributions to multiple academic 
literatures, it has several limitations that require future extension. First, my results do not 
provide conclusive evidence on the specific mechanism through which the level of 
managerial control influences decision makings. Prior studies have documented the 
presence of control concentration in family businesses, notably through the pyramidal 
structure (La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). The role of control concentration in 
123 
 
influencing controlling owners’ authority and consequently the conduciveness for 
organizational changes remains unclear.  
As an initial step to test the effect of concentrated control on the relationship 
between diversification and group performance, I add the interactions between total 
diversification and control concentration in the model (Table 22). The coefficients of the 
interactions are positive and significant, suggesting that the threshold of the U-shaped 
relationship will be earlier when the controlling owners have a higher level of 
concentrated control. This finding is consistent with the prediction of stewardship theory. 
Stewardship theory proposes a strong alignment between the success of the organization 
and the satisfaction of the controlling owners (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990). In 
the context of family businesses, controlling owners’ concern for the reputation, 
sustainability and career opportunities of the family are associated with the organizational 
performance. In other words, the controlling family of the business groups will tend to 
maximize minority shareholders’ interests through group performance. By doing so, their 
own utility functions will be maximized. Therefore, when controlling owners have higher 
control in the organization, they will pay committed efforts to support the business and 
demonstrate farsighted stewardship (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Future studies 
could explore the role of control concentration on the performance implications of 
diversification in a more thorough manner. 
Second, while I theorize and test the effects of family embeddedness on 
diversification decisions, its role in the relationship between diversification and group 
performance stays unknown. Prior research has considered the size of controlling owners’ 
family as an important resource, also known as ‘family social capital’ (Arregle et al., 
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2007). Following this argument, family social capital helps facilitate intra-group 
coordination in the process of diversification. The ‘soft accountability process’ is likely 
to effectively replace the normative frameworks, enhance the organizational synergy, and 
thus positively moderate the diversification-performance relationship. To test this 
argument, I add the interaction between total diversification and family size in the models 
in Table 22. The positive and significant coefficients show empirical supports. Future 
studies can further pursue this line of research and demonstrate the performance 
implications of family embeddedness in greater detail. 
Third, the impact of inheritance norm, one of the most documented familial norms, 
can change as the number of male and female descendants varies. Controlling owners 
might have greater incentives to pursue diversification to ensure successful succession 
when they have more male descendants (Wong, 1985). In order to test this argument, I 
count the number of male family size and female family size, and use them as alternative 
independent variables to predict controlling owners’ diversification decisions. As shown 
in Table 14, the coefficients of male family size are significantly positive, whereas the 
coefficients of female family size are insignificant. The mechanism through which the 
gender of the descendants influences strategic decisions merits more careful 
investigation. 
Fourth, I study diversification decision in family business based on business groups 
in Taiwan. The empirical focus responds to the recent calls by management scholars to 
test theories in non-Western cultural context (Barkema et al., 2002; Tsui, 2007). Future 
studies could examine how the controlling owners’ primary self-interest influences other 
strategic decisions such as acquisition, innovation and internationalization. Besides, since 
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family businesses are prevalent around the world, constituting over 85 percent of the 
world’s working population (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a), future studies can replicate my 
findings and check for result robustness using other empirical contexts. 
Fifth, the literature of business group has documented that pyramidal group 
structure allows the controlling family to expropriate minority shareholders by tunneling 
group resources out of the lower-down group firms (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 
1999; Morck et al., 2005). Heaney and Holmen (2008) show that the pyramidal structure 
in family businesses can help reduce the costs of the family’s under-diversified portfolio. 
In their study on business groups in Thailand, Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak and 
Schoar (2008) show that business groups with more family involvement have more 
pyramidal structure, more resource tunneling from the group firm to the family and thus 
lower performance. If this argument holds, I would expect a negative effect of the 
pyramidal group structure on group performance. Following Bertrand, Johnson, 
Samphantharak and Schoar (2008), I construct the variable pyramidal depth, where the 
maximum depth is the maximum number of layers that separate a group firm from the 
firm(s) at the top of the group. I add this variable in the models that predict group 
performance. Consistent with the findings by Bertrand and her coauthors (2008), the 
coefficients of pyramidal depth are significantly negative (Table 22). Future research can 
further test how controlling owners apply the pyramidal structure to achieve their primary 
goals and how such process influences group performance.  
Sixth, while the institutional inefficiency in emerging economies allows economic 
advantages for diversified business groups, such advantages may dissipate over time and 
may become a diversification discount (Lee et al. 2008). Future studies can examine the 
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diversification-performance relationship in multiple emerging countries that are in 
different stages of institutional transition.  
Lastly, future studies can employ different performance measures to capture 
different dimensions of the construct. For example, growth is an important goal in 
business group development. An examination of the impact that diversification has on the 
growth of business groups can increase the value of this dissertation to the business group 
literature.  




Table 1: Studies on Diversification, Business Group and Performance 
 
 
Author Year Major Finding Unit of Analysis 
Bae et al. 2011 
Unrelated diversification is associated with a significant value loss, 
but related diversification does not decrease firm value. Firm's 
affiliation with large business groups amplifies the valuation effects. 
Firm-year 
Buysschaert 
et al. 2008 
Profitability of group companies does not depend on the extent of 
group diversification. Group firm 
Chakrabarti 
et al. 2007 
Diversification negatively impacts performance in more developed 
institutional environments while improving performance only in the 
least developed environment. Firms affiliated with business groups 
do not gain from diversification, except in less developed 
institutional environment. 
Firm-year 
Chang et al. 2006 Diversification at the group level may negatively affect affiliate firms' innovation performance Firm-year 
Doukas et 
al. 2002 
Intra-group diversifying acquisitions show that bidders do not 
realize significant gains in diversifying or focusing investment 
strategies. Intra-group acquisitions are not necessarily associated 
with expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Firm-year 
Ferris et al. 2003 
There is a value loss for diversified business groups. The causes of 
value loss include the pursuit of profit stability rather than profit 
maximization, over-investment in low performing industries, and 




There is a U-shaped relationship between international 
diversification and firm performance. This relationship is moderated 




For firms affiliated to large business groups, corporate 
diversification enhances firm performance. However, business 
group diversity does not influence the diversification-performance 
relationship. 
Firm-year 
Hsieh et al 2012 
Firms that are affiliated with business groups innovate better than 
their unaffiliated counterparts. Group diversification and family ties 
have positive effects on firm innovation, while inside ownership has 




Group affiliates are found to engage in activities away from the 
group's core activity to serve as destination points for funds tunneled 
from a group's core activity. The finding confirms the hypothesis of 




The net benefit of affiliation with a diversified business group is 
positive if group diversification exceeds a threshold level. Firm-year 
Khanna & 
Palepu 2000c 
Performance of firm performance initially declines with group 
diversification and subsequently increases once group 






Affiliation with a diversified business group in emerging markets 
rarely entails value discount. Firm 
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Table 1: Studies on Diversification, Business Group and Performance (Cont’d) 
 
  
Author Year Major Finding Unit of Analysis 
Kim et al. 2010 
Group affiliation moderates the relationship between a firm's 
international diversification and the market-to-book value. The 
moderating effect varies at different stages of institutional change. 
Firm-year 
Lee et al. 2008 
Diversification premium through business groups in emerging 




Business group-affiliation appears not to significantly influence the 
performance of diversification strategies of member firms, whereas 
among non-group firms, domestic corporate ownership mitigates the 
negative influence of firm diversification on firm performance. 
Firm-year 
Singh et al. 2007 
Diversified firms perform significantly worse than focused firms in 
developing countries. For domestic business group affiliates, 





Table 2: Data Source of Studies on Diversification-Performance Relationship 
Author Year Data 
Amit & Livnat 1988 Public traded firms, Compustat 
Barton 1988 The 1974 Fortune 500 list of industrial companies, Compustat data 
Beattie 1980 
Subset of conglomerate mergers defined by the Federal Trade 
Commission 
Bergh 1995 40 Fortune 500 companies 
Bergh 1995 Random sample of Fortune 500 firms 
Bergh & Holbein 1997 180 Fortune 500 companies 
Bethel & Liebeskind 1993 93 public Fortune 500 firms 
Bettis & Hall 1982 Companies from Compustat and Fortune 500 
Bishara 1981 19 Canadian multinational firms & 21 conglomerate firms 
Buhner 1987 
40 large West German corporations of the top 300 firms in Western 
Germany 
Busija et al.  1997 Firms randomly selected from Fortune 500 
Cable & Yasuki 1985 Business group affiliates in Japan 
Capon et al.  1988 112 corporations from 258 corporations  
Carter 1977 500 industrial firms listed in the Fortune Directory 
Chang & Choi 1988 30 largest business groups in Korea 
Chang & Thomas 1989 64 firms, a subset of Rumelt's 1974 sample from Fortune 500 firms 
Chatterjee & Blocher 1992 191 firms from the Trinet data base 
Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt 1991 678 firms compiled from Trinet Establishment database and Compustat 
Christensen & 
Montgomery 1981 A subsample of 128 firms from Rumelt's 1974 study 
Ciscel & Evans 1984 222 corporations listed in the Fortune directory 
Dundas & Richardson 1982 22 unrelated product companies 
Gomez-Mejia & 
Palich 1997 Fortune 500 firms 
Grant & Jammine 1988 305 large U.K. manufacturing companies 
Grant et al. 1988 304 large British manufacturing companies 
Grinyer et al. 1980 48 large U.K. companies 
Habib & Victor 1991 144 U.S. manufacturing and service multinational corporations 
Hall & St. John 1994 205 firms developed from Standard and Poor's Compustat  
Hamilton & Shergill 1992 Non-financial companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange  
Hill 1983 60 U.K. firms selected from the top 300 firms in the Times 1000 
Hill 1988 156 large U.K. firms 
Hill & Hansen 1991 U.S. pharmaceutical firms 
Hill et al. 1992 184 Fortune 1000 firms 
Hill & Snell 1988 Fortune 500 listing for 1980 
Hitt et al. 1997 Standard & Poor's Compustat 
Hoskisson 1987 62 firms that have undergone the transition to an M-form  
Hoskisson et al. 1993 200 firms listed on the NYSE or AMEX stock exchanges  
Hoskisson & Johnson 1992 Firms in manufacturing industries listed on the Compustat 
Hughes & Oughton 1993 Firms in U.K. manufacturing industry 
Imel & Helmberger 1971 99 food and tobacco manufacturing companies 
Jacquemin & Berry 1979 460 of the largest U.S. manufacturing corporations 
Johnson & Thomas 1987 Companies in U.K. brewing industry 
Johnson et al. 1993 Firms in the manufacturing segment, Standard and Poor's Compustat 
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Table 2: Data Source of Studies on Diversification-Performance Relationship 
(Cont’d) 
 
Author Year Data 
Jose et al. 1986 Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business survey 
Keats 1990 Fortune 500 firms drawn from Rumelt's 1978 data bank 
Keats & Hitt 1988 110 firms drawn from Rumelt's 1978 data bank 
Kim et al. 1993 Large U.S. multinationals  
Lane et al. 1998 
309 firms (approximates Amihud and Lev's sample), Fortune 500 & 
Compustat 
Lang & Stulz 1994 Firms from Compustat 
Lecraw 1984 200 largest publicly-held, non-financial firms in Canada  
Lubatkin & Chatterjee 1991 Firms used by Rumelt (1974, 1978) and Hawks (1984), Compustat 
Lubatkin & Chatterjee 1994 Firms from the list used by Rumelt (1977) and Hawks (1984) 
Lubatkin et al. 1993 A list of firms from Automatic Data Processing 
Lubatkin & Rogers 1989 121 firms listed on CRSP for at least 40 consecutive months 
Markides & 
Williamson 1994 200 firms classified according to Rumelt's 1974 diversification categories 
Melicher & Rush 1973 
45 conglomerate and 45 non-conglomerate firms (Fortune 500 and 
Compustat) 
Melicher & Rush 1974 
A list of M&As prepared by the Federal Trade Commission and the New 
York Stock Exchange 
Michel & Shaked 1984 Data from American Home Products 
Montgomery 1985 128 Fortune 500 firms  
Mosakowski 1997 Computer firms that had undergone an initial public offering of stock 
Nguyen et al. 1990 Canadian manufacturing firms 
Palepu 1985 
30 firms from the food products industry group, data source includes 
Financial Accounting Standard Board, Standard and Poor, Compustat 
Palmer et al. 1993 Large U.S. industrial corporations 
Qian 1997 U.S.-product and market diversification  
Robins & Wiersema 1995 A sample of large manufacturing firms 
Rumelt 1982 100 firms from the 500 Industrial corporations in the U.S.  
Servaes 1996 Firms over the period 1961-1976 in manufacturing industry 
Simmonds 1990 73 Fortune 500 firms  
Smith & Weston 1977 38 conglomerate firms 
Varadarajan 1986 10 largest firms in each of the 24 largest industries of the U.S. 
Weston & 
Mansinghka 1971 1000 firms compiled by Forbes, Fortune and News Front magazines 
131 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Top Taiwanese Business Group 
 









Avg. Group Member 
Firm Employee 
1970 100 625 6.3 277000 2770 443 
1973 111 784 7.1 283000 2550 361 
1975 106 678 6.4 300000 2830 442 
1977 100 651 6.5 313000 3130 481 
1979 100 645 6.5 308000 3080 478 
1981 100 713 7.1 330000 3300 463 
1983 96 745 7.8 335000 3490 450 
1986 97 738 7.6 375000 3866 508 
1988 100 832 8.3 397000 3970 477 
1990 101 816 8.1 436000 4317 534 
1992 101 918 9.1 489000 4842 533 
1994 115 1091 9.5 577000 5017 529 
1996 113 1215 10.8 688000 6088 566 
1998 179 1944 10.9 770000 4302 396 
 
Source: Business Group Directory composed by China Credit Information Service, Ltd.  
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Variable N Mean Std. Min Max 
1. No. of 2-digit diversification 595 0.56 1.00 0 7 
2. No. of 3-digit diversification 595 0.75 1.18 0 7 
3. No. of 4-digit diversification 595 0.84 1.30 0 8 
4.Total diversification 595 0.50 0 2.26 0.93 
5.Unrelated diversification 595 0.46 0 2.05 0.77 
6. No. of 2-digit diversification through a new firm 595 0.43 0.86 0 6 
7. No. of 3-digit diversification through a new firm 595 0.55 0.99 0 6 
8. No. of 4-digit diversification through a new firm 595 0.64 1.05 0 6 
9. Family size 595 6.00 6.39 0 29 
10. 2nd generation family size 595 4.52 4.62 0 21 
11. Generation 595 0.23 0.42 0 1 
12. Foreign education 595 0.19 0.39 0 1 
13. Control concentration 595 0.43 0.27 0.07 1 
14. Age 592 60.33 12.02 29 91 
15. ROA (logged) 551 1.44 1.01 -3.91 3.49 
16. Debt ratio 594 2.79 1.80 1.16 14.79 
17. U.S. patents 595 4.10 35.29 0 651 
18. Political connection 595 0.11 0.32 0 1 
19. Group age (logged) 595 3.41 0.42 1.39 4.34 
20. Institutional development 595 0.51 0.50 0 1 
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Table 5: Correlation of Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. No. of 2-digit diversification 
       
  
2. No. of 3-digit diversification 0.91*
      
  
3. No. of 4-digit diversification 0.84* 0.93*
     
  
4.Total diversification 0.06 0.07 0.10*
    
  
5.Unrelated diversification 0.08 0.08 0.10* 0.90*
   
  
6. No. of 2-digit diversification through a new firm 0.89 0.80* 0.71* 0.07 0.09*
  
  
7. No. of 3-digit diversification through a new firm 0.83 0.89* 0.79* 0.08 0.10* 0.91*
 
  
8. No. of 4-digit diversification through a new firm 0.81 0.87* 0.85* 0.10* 0.12* 0.86* 0.95*   
9. Family size 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.35* 0.33* 0.06 0.07 0.10*  
10. 2nd generation family size 0.07 0.08 0.10* 0.40* 0.37* 0.06 0.07 0.12* 0.90* 
11. Generation -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.17* 0.17* -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.10* 
12. Foreign education 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 
13. Control concentration -0.04 -0.07 -0.08* -0.28* -0.27* -0.06 -0.10* -0.11* -0.28* 
14. Age -0.08* -0.10* -0.11* 0.11* 0.10* -0.08 -0.09* -0.08* 0.23* 
15. ROA (logged) 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.15* -0.19* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09* 
16. Debt ratio 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12* 0.16* 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.18* 
17. U.S. patents 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.10* 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.05 
18. Political connection 0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.36* 0.32* 0.10* 0.12* 0.13* 0.50* 
19. Group age (logged) -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.17* 0.16* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.27* 
20. Institutional development -0.13* -0.12* -0.09* 0.14* 0.15* -0.08* -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
10. 2nd generation family size  
       
  
11. Generation 0.06 
       
  
12. Foreign education -0.08* 0.13*
      
  
13. Control concentration -0.28* -0.21* 0.03
     
  
14. Age 0.29* -0.10* -0.34* -0.18*
    
  
15. ROA (logged) -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.11*
   
  
16. Debt ratio 0.22* -0.08* -0.01 -0.09* -0.01 -0.32*
  
  
17. U.S. patents -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.09* 0.07 -0.07
 
  
18. Political connection 0.45* 0.09* 0.03 -0.17* 0.08 -0.13* 0.24* -0.03   
19. Group age (logged) 0.22* 0.32* -0.06 -0.21* 0.33* 0.03 -0.09* -0.12* 0.24*  
20. Institutional development -0.08* 0.15* 0.13* -0.16* 0.03 -0.02 -0.12* 0.11* -0.07 0.13* 
*p < 0.05, two-tailed test 
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Table 6: Description of Family Characteristics 
 
Family Characteristics N Mean Std. Min Max 
Generation 101 0.23 .42 0 1 
Family founder 101 0.91 .07 0 3 
Male founders 101 0.90 .07 0 3 
Female founders 101 0.04 .02 0 1 
Founder multiple wives 101 0.54 .75 0 3 
Founder relation (0: kinship, 1: friendship, 2: single) 101 1.42 .09 0 2 
Family size 101 6.00 6.39 0 29 
Family size direct 101 4.44 .44 0 21 
2nd generation direct family size 101 2.69 .27 0 11 
2nd generation indirect family size 101 0.95 .24 0 17 
2nd generation family size 101 4.52 4.62 0 22 
Male 2nd generation family size 101 2.84 .29 0 12 
Female 2nd generation family size 101 0.93 .19 0 11 
3rd generation direct family size 101 0.83 .24 0 15 
3rd generation indirect family size 101 0.18 .10 0 9 
3rd generation family size 101 1.01 .28 0 15 
Male 3rd generation family size 101 0.73 .18 0 9 







Table 7: Difference between Founder Generation and Second Generation 
 
Variable Founder Generation Second Generation Difference 
Age 60.99 (0.42) 58.86 (0.87) 2.13** (0.94) 
Gender (dummy, 1 for female) 0.01 (0.00) 0.13 (0.02) -0.12*** (0.01) 
Foreign Education (dummy) 0.14 (0.01) 0.36 (0.03) -0.21*** (0.03) 
Working experience in U.S. (dummy) 0.03 (0.01) 0.07 (0.02) -0.03** (0.02) 
Total diversification 0.87 (0.02) 1.04 (0.04) -0.16*** (0.04) 
Control concentration 0.53 (0.01) 0.42 (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 
No. of firms 8.29 (0.21) 11.82 (0.57) -3.54*** (0.50) 
No. of new ventures 1.17 (0.07) 1.44 (0.14) -0.27* (0.15) 
 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01, two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 8: Results on No. of 2-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Poisson Model) 
 
DV: No. of 2-digit diversification 1 2 3 4 5 
Control variable      
Control concentration 0.06 (.34) -0.09 (.37) -0.18(.37) -0.10(.36) -0.19(.36) 
Age -0.01 (.01) -0.02† (.01) -0.03***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.03***(.01) 
ROA (logged) 0.05 (.08) -0.08(.08) -0.09(.08) -0.09(.08) -0.10(.08) 
Debt ratio -0.03(.06) -0.10(.07) -0.11†(.07) -0.12†(.07) -0.13†(.07) 
U.S. patents 0.001 (.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(0.00) 
Political connection 0.91†(.47) 0.31(.50) 0.57(.51) 0.38(.49) 0.67(.50) 
Group age (logged) -0.31(.28) 0.30(.35) 0.16(.35) 0.31(.35) 0.18(.35) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable      
Family size (H1 +)  0.04**(.02) 0.04**(.02)   
2nd generation family size (H1 +)    0.06**(.03) 0.06**(.03) 
Generation (H3 -)  -0.61**(.28) -0.59**(.28) -0.65**(.29) -0.60**(.28) 
Foreign education (H5 -)   -0.83*** (.32)  -0.75**(.36) 
No. of business groups 92 92 92 92 92 
No. of observations 462 462 462 462 462 
Log likelihood -429.32 -407.96 -404.28 -407.54 -404.46 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis  
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Table 9: Results on No. of 3-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Poisson Model) 
 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
DV: No. of 3-digit diversification 1 2 3 4 5 
Control variable      
Control concentration -0.66**(.31) -0.71**(.31) -0.75**(.31) -0.70**(.31) -0.75**(.31) 
Age -0.01(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.02***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.02***(.01) 
ROA (logged) 0.01(.07) 0.001(.07) -0.01(.07) -0.01(.07) -0.02(.07) 
Debt ratio -0.12*(.06) -0.11*(.06) -0.12* (.06) -0.13**(.06) -0.13**(.06) 
U.S. patents 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 
Political connection 0.58(.39) 0.41(.41) 0.59(.42) 0.44(.40) 0.74*(.42) 
Group age (logged) 0.18(.29) 0.31(.30) 0.22(.31) 0.32(.31) 0.21(.30) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable      
Family size (H1 +)  0.03*(.02) 0.04**(.02)   
2nd generation family size (H1 +)    0.05**(.02) 0.05**(.02) 
Generation (H3 -)  -0.54**(.24) -0.54**(.24) -0.57**(.24) -0.42**(.19) 
Foreign education (H5 -)   -0.58**(.27)  -0.51*(.27) 
No. of business groups 91 91 91 91 91 
No. of observations 462 462 462 462 462 
Log likelihood -487.90 -484.47 -482.07 -484.00 -480.92 
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Table 10: Results on No. of 4-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Poisson Model) 
 
DV: No. of 4-digit diversification 1 2 3 4 5 
Control variable      
Control concentration -0.58**(.28) -0.62**(.28) -0.81***(.29) -0.78***(.29) -0.81***(.29) 
Age -0.01(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.01*(.01) -0.02**(.01) 
ROA (logged) 0.09(.06) 0.10(.07) -0.01(.07) -0.01(.07) -0.01(.07) 
Debt ratio -0.05(.05) -0.03(.05) -0.11*(.06) -0.12**(.06) -0.13**(.06) 
U.S. patents 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.001(.00) 0.003(.00) 0.002(.00) 
Political connection 0.86**(.35) 0.66*(/37) 0.44(.38) 0.33(.37) 0.48(.38) 
Group age (logged) -0.42*(.24) -0.26(.26) 0.10(.29) 0.16(.29) 0.11(.29) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable      
Family size (H1 +)  0.04**(.02) 0.04***(.02)   
2nd generation family size (H1 +)    0.06***(.02) 0.06***(.02) 
Generation (H3 -)  -0.39*(.21) -0.33(.22) -0.33(.022) -0.32(.22) 
Foreign education (H5 -)   -0.48**(.24)  -0.42*(.24) 
No. of business groups 91 91 91 91 91 
No. of observations 462 462 462 462 462 
Log likelihood -556.76 -549.20 -522.68 -524.46 -522.85 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 11: Results on Entry Mode of 2-Digit Diversification 
(Year 1980-2000, Logit Model) 
 
DV: 2-digit diversification mode 
(1= New firm) 1 2 3 4 5 
Control variable      
Control concentration -3.01***(1.11) -2.77**(1.19) -2.99**(1.21) -2.65**(1.19) -2.86**(1.20) 
Age -0.02(.03) -0.04(.03) -0.03(.03) -0.04(.03) -0.02(.03) 
ROA (logged) 0.18(.28) 0.27(.29) 0.27(.29) 0.27(.29) 0.28(.29) 
U.S. patents 0.001(.01) 0.001(.01) 0.01(.01) 0.001(.01) 0.01(.01) 
Political connection -0.31(.98) 1.50(1.19) 2.20*(1.33) 1.10(1.14) 1.88(1.29) 
Group age (logged) -0.64**(.32) -0.74*(.38) -0.66*(.38) -0.71*(.40) -0.65*(.40) 
Industry capital cost 3.91(2.69) 2.43(2.84) 2.47(2.86) 2.80(2.85) 2.89(2.87) 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable      
Family size (H2 +)  0.30**(.13) 0.31**(.13)   
2nd generation family size (H2 +)    0.29*(.29) 0.32*(.18) 
Generation (H4 -)  -1.21*(.66) -1.55**(.74) -1.08(.69) -1.41*(.74) 
Foreign education (H6 -)   0.96(.81)  1.08(.83) 
No. of observations 123 123 123 123 123 
Log likelihood -55.32 -49.59 -48.84 -51.03 -50.10 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 12: Results on Entry Mode of 3-Digit Diversification 
(Year 1980-2000, Logit Model) 
 
DV: 3-digit diversification mode 
(1=New firm) 1 2 3 4 5 
Control variable      
Control concentration -2.69***(.82) -2.59***(.90) -2.68***(.90) -2.49***(.90) -2.56***(.89) 
Age -0.002(.02) -0.03(.27) -0.02(.02) -0.02(.02) -0.01(.02) 
ROA (logged) -0.21(.26) -0.03(.27) -0.05(.27) -0.05(.27) -0.06(.27) 
U.S. patents 0.003(.01) 0.001(.01) 0.001(.01) 0.001(.01) 0.001(.01) 
Political connection 0.58(.90) 2.15**(1.01) 2.82**(1.11) 1.91**(.99) 2.63**(1..09) 
Group age (logged) -0.27(0.26) -0.35(.32) -0.32(.31) -0.37(.34) -0.36(.33) 
Industry capital cost 2.16(2.10) 0.99(2.25) 0.95(2.26) 1.18(2.25) 1.17(2.27) 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable      
Family size (H2 +)  0.27***(.10) 0.29***(.10)   
2nd generation family size (H2 +)    0.31**(.14) 0.35**(.14) 
Generation (H4 -)  -1.20**(.56) -1.48((.60) -1.08**(.58) -1.35**(.60) 
Foreign education (H6 -)   0.92(.63)  1.00(.63) 
No. of observations 164 164 164 164 164 
Log likelihood -80.11 -71.98 -70.84 -73.16 -71.84 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 13: Results on Entry Mode of 4-Digit Diversification 
(Year 1980-2000, Logit Model) 
 
DV: 4-digit diversification mode 
(1=New firm) 1 2 3 4 5 
Control variable      
Control concentration -2.49***(.74) -2.39***(.81) -2.46***(.81) -2.29***(.81) -2.32***(.81) 
Age 0.001(.02) -0.02(.02) -0.01(.02) -0.02(.02) -0.42(.28) 
ROA (logged) -0.06(.23) 0.11(.23) 0.11(.24) 0.09(.23) 0.10(.24) 
U.S. patents 0.001(.00) 0.001(.01) 0.001(.01) 0.001(.00) 0.004(.01) 
Political connection 0.99(.84) 2.36(.95) 3.15***(1.04) 2.19**(.94) 3.06***(1.03) 
Group age (logged) -0.25(.21) -0.33(.25) -0.33(.25) -0.39(.28) -0.42(.28) 
Industry capital cost 1.71(2.00) 0.81(2.14) 0.86(2.16) 0.91(2.14) 0.98(2.17) 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable      
Family size (H2 +)  0.25***(.09) 0.28***(.09)   
2nd generation family size (H2 +)    0.31**(.12) 0.37***(0.13) 
Generation (H4 -)  -1.11**(.48) -1.39***(.51) -1.00**(.50) -1.27**(.52) 
Foreign education (H6 -)   1.14**(.56)  1.27**(.58) 
No. of observations 187 187 187 187 187 
Log likelihood -95.38 -86.47 -84.25 -87.19 -84.58 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 14: Results on Male and Female Family Size and Diversification (Year 1980-2000) 
 
 
Level of diversification 
(Poisson model) 
Mode of diversification (1=New firm) 
(Logit model) 
 1 2 3 4 
Independent variable      
Male family size  0.05**(.02)  0.18**(.08)  Female family size   0.09(.06)  0.05(.11) Generation -0.46**(-.46) -0.35(.22) -1.15**(.50) -1.38***(.49) 
Foreign education -0.81***(-.81) -0.83***(.32) 1.28**(.58) 1.10*(.57) 
No. of observations  462 462 305 205 
Log likelihood  -404.79 -405.56 -98.95 -101.92 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
Control variables: Control concentration, age, ROA, U.S. patents, political connection, group age, 




Table 15: Results on Moderating Effect for No. of 2-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Poisson Model) 
 
DV: No. of 2-digit diversification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation -0.50*(.27) -0.36*(.22) -0.47**(.22) -0.38*(.22) -0.51*(.27) -0.46**(.22) -0.58**(.28) -0.53*(.28) 
Foreign education  -0.75**(.31) -0.57*(.31) -0.80***(.31) -0.60*(.31) -0.69**(.30) -0.64**(.31) -0.77**(.31) -0.70**(.31) 
Age -0.03***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.03***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.03**(.01) -0.03***(.01) -0.03**(.01) -0.02**(.01) 
ROA (logged) 0.00 (.08) 0.01(.08) 0.00(.08) 0.01(.08) -0.00(.08) -0.01(.08) -0.01(.08) -0.02(.08) 
Debt ratio -0.09(.07) -0.09(.07) -0.10(.07) -0.10(.07) -0.10(.07) -0.11(.07) -0.12*(.07) -0.13*(.07) 
U.S. patents 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
Political connection 0.78(.50) 0.49(.53) 0.88*(.50) 0.49(.53) 0.88*(.49) 0.82*(.51) 0.86*(.49) 0.71(.50) 
Group age (logged) 0.09(.32) 0.25(.32) 0.12(.32) 0.25(.32) 0.10(.32) 0.24(.32) 0.13(.33) 0.23(.33) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable         
Family size  0.04*(.02) -0.04(.03) 0.05**(.02) -0.03     
2nd generation family size      0.05*(.03) -0.01(.04) 0.07**(.03) 0.01(.04) 
Control concentration -0.21(.36) -1.57***(.53) -0.23(.36) -1.49***(.53) -0.22(.35) -0.98**(.48) -0.24(.35) -0.91*(.48) 
Institutional development -0.30*(.17) -0.33*(.17) 0.00(.23) -0.16(.23) -0.31*(.19) -0.31*(.17) -0.05(.22) -0.15(.23) 
Interaction         
Family size × Control 
concentration (H7 +)  0.21***(.06)  0.19***(.06)     
Family size × Institutional 
development (H9 –)   -0.03*(.02) -0.02(.02)     
2nd generation family size × 
Control concentration (H7 +)      0.16**(.07)  0.14**(.07) 
2nd generation family size × 
Institutional development (H9 –)       -0.05*(.03) -0.04(.03) 
No. of business groups 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
No. of observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Log likelihood -419.74 -412.53 -417.50 -411.94 -419.89 -416.41 -418.37 -416.30 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 16: Results on Moderating Effect for No. of 3-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Poisson Model) 
 
DV: No. of 3-digit diversification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation -0.51**(.23) -0.40*(.23) -0.46**(.19) -0.40**(.19) -0.45**(.18) -0.47*(.23) -0.48**(.19) -0.58**(.24) 
Foreign education  -0.59*(.27) -0.43*(.26) -0.62**(.26) -0.51*(.27) -0.50*(.26) -0.46*(.26) -0.63**(.26) -0.59**(.26) 
Age -0.03***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.03***(.01) -0.02***(.01) -0.03***(.01) -0.02***(.01) -0.03**(.01) -0.03***(.01) 
ROA (logged) 0.10(.07) 0.08(.07) 0.05(.07) 0.06(.07) 0.06(.07) 0.06(.07) 0.05(.07) 0.04(.07) 
Debt ratio -0.08(.06) -0.10*(.06) -0.11*(.06) -0.11*(.06) -0.10*(.06) -0.12*(.06) -0.13**(.06) -0.15**(.06) 
U.S. patents 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
Political connection 0.87*(.41) 0.53(.43) 0.89**(.42) 0.66(.43) 0.93**(.41) 0.72*(.42) 0.94*(.41) 0.73*(.41) 
Group age (logged) 0.01(.28) 0.18(.28) 0.11(.28) 0.18(.28) 0.11(.28) 0.17(.28) 0.11(.28) 0.19(.29) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable         
Family size  0.03**(.02) -0.02(.02) 0.05***(.02) 0.01(.03)     
2nd generation family size      0.04*(.02) 0.01(.03) 0.07***(.02) 0.05(.03) 
Control concentration -0.65**(.31) -1.64***(.45) -0.72**(.30) -1.50***(.45) -0.72**(.30) -1.15***(.41) -0.72**(.30) -1.02**(.41) 
Institutional development -0.27*(.16) -0.47***(.15) 0.03(.20) -0.07(.20) -0.40***(.15) -0.46***(.15) 0.02(.17) -0.06(.20) 
Interaction         
Family size × Control 
concentration (H7 +)  0.15***(.05)  0.12**(.05)     
Family size × Institutional 
development (H9 –)   -0.05***(.02) -0.05***(.02)     
2nd generation family size × 
Control concentration (H7 +)      0.01*(.06)  0.07(.06) 
2nd generation family size × 
Institutional development (H9 –)       -0.07***(.02) -0.07***(.02) 
No. of business groups 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
No. of observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Log likelihood -502.50 -495.41 -493.89 -491.05 -498.88 -498.39 -494.62 -493.97 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 17: Results on Moderating Effect for No. of 4-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Poisson Model) 
 
DV: No. of 4-digit diversification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation -0.27*(.16) -0.15(.21) -0.28*(.17) -0.22(.17) -0.29*(.16) -0.21(.16) -0.31*(.17) -0.24(.17) 
Foreign education  -0.46**(.23) -0.35(.24) -0.57**(.24) -0.46*(.24) -0.40*(.23) -0.37(.23) -0.48**(.23) -0.44*(.24) 
Age -0.02***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.02***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.02***(.01) -0.02**(.01) -0.02***(.01) -0.02**(.01) 
ROA (logged) 0.06(.07) 0.07(.07) 0.05(.06) 0.06(.06) 0.06(.07) 0.07(.07) 0.04(.06) 0.05(.06) 
Debt ratio -0.08(.06) -0.09*(.06) -0.11*(.06) -0.11*(.06) -0.10*(.06) -0.08(.06) -0.13**(.06) -0.12**(.06) 
U.S. patents 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
Political connection 0.69*(.38) 0.37(.39) 0.68*(.38) 0.46(.39) 0.74*(.37) 0.43(.39) 0.77**(.37) 0.48(.39) 
Group age (logged) -0.01(.26) 0.07(.27) 0.00(.26) 0.09(.27) 0.01(.26) 0.09(.26) 0.03(.26) 0.09(.26) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable         
Family size  0.04**(.02) -0.01(.02) 0.06***(.02) 0.02(.02)     
2nd generation family size      0.05**(.02) -0.01(.03) 0.08***(.02) 0.02(.03) 
Control concentration -0.76***(.28) -1.71***(.42) -0.76***(9.28) -1.54***(.42) -0.77***(.28) -1.65***(.40) -0.78***(.28) -1.55***(.40) 
Institutional development -0.38***(.14) -0.46***(.14) 0.07(.19) -0.03(.19) -0.39***(.14) -0.42***(.14) 0.04(.18) -0.04(.19) 
Interaction         
Family size × Control 
concentration (H7 +)  0.15***(.05)  0.12***(.05)     
Family size × Institutional 
development (H9 –)   -0.06***(.02) -0.05***(.02)     
2nd generation family size × 
Control concentration (H7 +)      0.14***(.04)  0.12***(.04) 
2nd generation family size × 
Institutional development (H9 –)       -0.05***(.02) -0.05***(.02) 
No. of business groups 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
No. of observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Log likelihood -540.41 -535.85 -533.58 -530.29 -540.32 -535.40 -534.04 -530.23 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 18: Results on Moderating Effect for Entry Mode of 2-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Logit Model) 
 
DV: 2-digit diversification mode 
(1= New firm) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation  0.01(.01) 0.00(.39) 0.01(.42) 0.03(.39) 0.01(.01) -0.20(.38) 0.03(.42) 0.01(.01) 
Foreign education  0.05(.21) 0.30(.72) 0.33(.73) 0.46(.78) 1.07(.83) 0.31(.21) 0.03(.19) 0.21(.22) 
Age -0.05*(.03) -0.05*(.03) -0.06**(.03) -0.06**(.03) -0.04(.03) -0.04(.03) -0.06**(.03) -0.05*(.03) 
ROA (logged) -0.32(.33) -0.17(.33) -0.15(.33) -0.20(.34) -0.28(.33) 0.13(.29) -0.13(.33) 0.20(.31) 
U.S. patents 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 0.00(.01) 
Political connection 0.09(1.61) -1.04(.88) -1.37*(.82) -0.92(.90) 0.60(1.55) -1.66*(.99) -1.55*(.91) -2.06*(1.15) 
Group age (logged) -0.80**(.33) -0.53*(.32) -0.56*(.33) -0.36(.34) -0.85(.34) -0.78**(.36) -0.58*(.34) -0.42(.40) 
Industry capital cost 4.03(3.00) 5.50**(2.70) 6.89**(2.67) 5.20*(2.90) 4.66(3.11) 5.41**(2.61) 6.65**(2.65) 4.67*(2.79) 
Independent variable         
Family size  0.17**(.10) -0.07(.07) -0.08(.06) -0.36**(.15)     
2nd generation family size      0.28**(.14) -0.04(.10) -0.05(.09) -0.52*(.29) 
Control concentration -2.88***(1.11) -4.04***(1.27) -3.39***(1.18) -4.74***(1.41) -2.99***(1.12) -4.16***(1.29) -3.33***(1.17) -4.60**(1.46) 
Institutional development 0.74(.61) 1.17**(.58) 0.23(.73) -0.14(.79) 0.72(.63) 1.23**(.62) 0.61(.70) 0.22(.92) 
Interaction         
Family size × Control 
concentration (H8 +)  0.17**(.58)  0.57**(.26)     
Family size × Institutional 
development (H10 –)   0.13*(.08) 0.29**(.12)     
2nd generation family size × 
Control concentration (H8 +)      0.21(.23)  0.94*(.49) 
2nd generation family size × 
Institutional development (H10 –)       0.12(.11) 0.44*(.23) 
No. of observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Log likelihood -60.38 -58.45 -57.51 -54.52 -59.05 -53.31 -58.33 -50.07 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 19: Results on Moderating Effect for Entry Mode of 3-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Logit Model) 
 
DV: 3-digit diversification mode 
(1= New firm) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation  -0.34(.37) -0.49(.31) -0.50(.31) -0.50*(.31) -0.52(.38) -0.43(.31) -0.47(.32) -0.44(.31) 
Foreign education  1.30*(.69) 0.16(.50) 0.18(.50) 0.30(.52) 0.27(.18) 0.24(.17) 0.19(.16) 0.25(.17) 
Age -0.02(.02) -0.01(.02) -0.02(.02) -0.02(.02) -0.01(.02) -0.01(.02) -0.02(.02) -0.01(.02) 
ROA (logged) -0.29(.28) -0.26(.27) -0.12(.26) -0.20 (.27) -0.14(.27) -0.26(.26) -0.17(.26) -0.23(.27) 
U.S. patents 0.00(.01) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
Political connection 1.88(1.21) -0.16(.70) -0.36(.67) 0.08(.73) 1.36(1.26) -0.80(.75) -0.90(.72) -0.73(.75) 
Group age (logged) -0.51*(.29) -0.17(.26) -0.21(.27) -0.13(.27) -0.71**(.32) -0.25(.27) -0.29(.27) -0.21(.27) 
Industry capital cost 3.13(2.50) 2.93(2.07) 3.88*(2.04) 2.82(2.11) 0.73(2.29) 3.04(2.09) 3.83*(2.04) 2.99(2.10) 
Independent variable         
Family size  0.18**(.09) -0.11*(.06) -0.05(.04) -0.21**(.09)     
2nd generation family size      0.37**(.15) -0.09(.08) 0.01(.07) -0.17(.11) 
Control concentration -2.26**(.92) -4.34***(.49) -3.26***(.92) -4.41***(1.10) -2.59***(.97) -3.89***(1.05) -3.14***(.93) -3.94***(1.06) 
Institutional development 0.58(.52) 0.87*(.49) 0.40**(.60) 0.23(.62) 0.40(.56) 0.89*(.49) 0.73(.59) 0.57(.60) 
Interaction         
Family size × Control 
concentration (H8 +)  0.27*(.15)  0.40**(.18)     
Family size × Institutional 
development (H10 –)   0.06(.06) 0.12*(.07)     
2nd generation family size × 
Control concentration (H8 +)      0.34*(.21)  0.44*(.24) 
2nd generation family size × 
Institutional development (H10 –)       0.01(.09) 0.09(.10) 
No. of observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Log likelihood -80.21 -79.54 -80.67 -77.93 -83.20 -79.16 -80.57 -78.71 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 20: Results on Moderating Effect for Entry Mode of 4-Digit Diversification (Year 1980-2000, Logit Model) 
 
DV: 4-digit diversification mode 
(1= New firm) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation  0.01(.02) 0.01(.01) 0.01(.01) 0.01(.01) 0.01(.02) 0.01(.01) 0.01(.01) 0.01(.01) 
Foreign education  0.94*(.54) 0.37(.45) 0.34(.44) 0.46(.46) 0.36**(.16) 0.29*(.14) 0.24*(.13) 0.32**(.14) 
Age -0.01(.02) 0.01(.02) 0.00(.02) 0.00(.02) -0.02(.02) 0.00(.02) 0.00(.02) 0.00(.02) 
ROA (logged) -0.14(.25) -0.14(.25) -0.06(.24) -0.14(.25) -0.18(.26) -0.12(.25) -0.06(.24) -0.13(.25) 
U.S. patents 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 0.00(.00) 
Political connection 1.80(1.40) -0.26(.66) -0.47(.63) -0.14(.67) 0.35(1.38) -0.95(.68) -1.09(.67) -0.95(.67) 
Group age (logged) -0.62***(.24) -0.23(.21) -0.27(.21) -0.22(.21) -0.81***(.27) -0.32(.22) -0.36*(.22) -0.31(.22) 
Industry capital cost 1.32(2.10) 3.72**(1.88) 4.03**(1.87) 3.45(1.91) 0.87(2.13) 3.75**(1.91) 4.09**(1.91) 3.55*(1.94) 
Independent variable         
Family size  0.27***(.09) -0.07(.05) -0.04(.04) -0.14**(.07)     
2nd generation family size      0.39***(.14) -0.03(.07) 0.01(.06) -0.11(.09) 
Control concentration -1.75**(.83) -3.02***(.89) -2.32***(.77) -3.04**(.91) -1.50*(.85) -2.55***(.89) -1.94**(.80) -2.59***(.92) 
Institutional development 0.45(.51) 0.82*(.44) 0.36(.57) 0.21(.58) 0.51(.53) 0.97**(.45) 0.62(.56) 0.48(.57) 
Interaction         
Family size × Control 
concentration (H8 +)  0.14(.12)  0.22*(.13)     
Family size × Institutional 
development (H10 –)   0.06(.05) 0.09(.06)     
2nd generation family size × 
Control concentration (H8 +)      0.21(.17)  0.32*(.18) 
2nd generation family size × 
Institutional development (H10 –)       0.06(.07) 0.11(.08) 
No. of observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
Log likelihood -106.16 -100.19 -100.20 -98.80 -105.05 -98.61 -99.09 -97.59 
 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
149 
 
Table 21: Results on Performance Implication of Diversification (Year 1980-2000, GEE Model) 
 
DV: Group ROA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Control variable          
Family size 0.02**(.01) 0.02**(.01) 0.02**(.01) 0.02*(.01) 0.02**(.01) 0.02**(.01) 0.02**(.01) 0.02**(.01) 0.02**(.01) 
Generation  0.04(.13) 0.22*(.13) 0.11(.13) 0.12(.13) 0.09(.13) 0.21*(.13) 0.15(.13) 0.16(.13) 0.14(.13) 
Control concentration -0.60***(.12) -0.57***(.11) -0.57***(.11) -0.56***(.12) -0.56***(.11) -0.58***(.11) -0.70***(.12) -0.68***(.12) -0.68***(.12) 
Age 0.02***(.00) 0.02***(.00) 0.02***(.00) 0.02***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.02***(.00) 0.02***(.00) 0.02***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 
ROA (logged) 0.07(.05) 0.08*(.05) 0.06(.05) 0.07(.05) 0.08*(.05) 0.08*(.05) 0.07(.05) 0.08*(.05) 0.09*(.05) 
Debt ratio -0.08**(.03) -0.11***(.03) -0.12***(.03) -0.11***(.03) -0.11***(.03) -0.11***(.03) -0.11***(.03) -0.10***(.03) -0.10***(.03) 
Pyramidal depth -0.07**(.03) -0.07**(.03) -0.07**(.03) -0.06*(.03) -0.06*(.03) -0.07**(.03) -0.07**(.03) -0.06**(.03) -0.06*(.03) 
Political connection -0.21***(.07) -0.48***(.09) -0.44***(.09) -0.43***(.09) -0.41***(.09) -0.48***(.09) -0.38***(.09) -0.39***(.09) -0.36***(.09) 
Group age (logged) -0.28*(.15) -0.21(.16) -0.25(.16) -0.25(.16) -0.24(.16) -0.19(.16) -0.31*(.16) -0.31*(.17) -0.31*(.16) 
Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Independent variable          
Total diversification   0.05(.11) -1.02***(.36) -0.98***(.36) -1.00***(.35)     
Total diversification square 
(H11 U-shape)   0.54***(.17) 0.52***(.17) 0.53***(.17)     
Unrelated diversification       -0.03(.11) -1.02***(.34) -0.96***(.34) -0.99***(.34) 
Unrelated diversification square 
(H11 U-shape)       0.60***(.19) 0.56***(.20) 0.58***(.20) 
No. of related diversification 
through a new division (H12 +)    0.24*(.12)    0.23*(.12)  
No. of related diversification 
through a new firm     -0.03(.04)    -0.03(.04)  
No. of unrelated diversification 
through a new division      0.37**(.17)    0.37**(.17) 
No. of unrelated diversification 
through a new firm (H13 +)     -0.05(.05)    -0.03(.05) 
No. of business groups 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
No. of observations 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 
Wald Chi-square 8891.44 8900.75 8970.1 9088.32 9107.36 8909.17 9016.25 9131.8 9160.71 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
150 
 
Table 22: Results on Moderating Effect for Performance Implication of Diversification (Year 1980-2000, GEE Model) 
 
DV: Group ROA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Control variable         
Generation  0.07(.11) 0.03(.11) 0.07(.12) -0.01(.12) 0.06(.12) 0.03(.12) 0.06(.12) -0.03(.12) 
Age 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 0.01***(.00) 
ROA (logged) 0.25***(.05) 0.25***(.05) 0.26***(.05) 0.19***(.05) 0.25***(.05) 0.25***(.05) 0.26***(.05) 0.26***(.05) 
Debt ratio -0.04(.03) -0.05*(.03) -0.04*(.03) -0.06**(.03) -0.04(.03) -0.05*(.03) -0.04*(.03) -0.05*(.03) 
Pyramidal depth -0.08**(.03) -0.08**(.03) -0.08**(.03) -0.03(.04) -0.08**(.03) -0.07**(.03) -0.08**(.03) -0.07**(.03) 
Political connection -0.15(.18) -0.20(.18) -0.16(.18) -0.23(.20) -0.15(.18) -0.17(.18) -0.16(.18) -0.18(.18) 
Group age (logged) -0.09(.13) -0.04(.13) -0.08(.13) -0.01(.14) -0.09(.13) -0.04(.13) -0.08(.13) -0.04(.13) 
Independent variable         
Total diversification  -0.61(.43) -0.69(.43) -0.74*(.43) -0.72*(.42)     
Total diversification square 0.07(.18) -0.07(.19) 0.10(.18) -0.08(.19)     
No. of related diversification through a 
new division 0.36***(.12) 0.34***(.12)   0.38***(.12) 0.37***(.12)   
No. of related diversification through a 
new firm 0.01(.04) -0.001(.04)   0.01(.04) 0.01(.04)   
Unrelated diversification      -0.73*(.44) -0.82(.44) -0.83*(.44) -0.92**(.44) 
Unrelated diversification square     0.16(.21) 0.05(.22) 0.20(.21) 0.08(.22) 
No. of unrelated diversification through a 
new division    0.57***(.18) 0.41**(.17)   0.58***(.18) 0.56***(.18) 
No. of unrelated diversification through a 
new firm   -0.01(.06) -0.07(.05)   -0.01(.06) -0.01(.06) 
Control concentration  -0.82**(.38) -0.99***(.39) -0.93**(.38) -1.16***(.38) -0.55(.36) -0.67*(.36) -0.62*(.35) -0.73**(.36) 
Family size 0.01(.01) -0.04*(.02) 0.01(.01) -0.05**(.02) 0.01(.01) -0.02(.02) 0.01(.01) -0.02(.02) 
Interaction         
Total diversification × Control 
concentration 0.99**(.41) 0.04**(.01) 1.14***(.41) 0.04***(.02) 0.75*(.43) 0.89**(.43) 0.87**(.43) 0.03*(.02) 
Total diversification× Family size  1.15***(.41)  1.19***(.40)  0.03*(.02)  1.00**(.43) 
No. of business groups 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
No. of observations 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 429 
Wald Chi-square 87.78 90.91 90.91 127.28 85.08 90.99 86.71 117.95 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; two-tailed test, standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 23: Summary of Key Findings 
 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The larger the family size the controlling owners have, the higher the 
level of diversification they will pursue in business groups.  
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The larger the family size the controlling owners have, the more likely 




Hypothesis 3 (H3): The second-generation controlling owners will pursue lower level of 
diversifications in business groups than the founder-generation. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The second-generation controlling owners are less likely to pursue 
diversifications in business groups through a new firm than the founder-generation. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The controlling owners with foreign education will pursue lower level 
of diversifications in business groups than those without foreign education.  
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The controlling owners with foreign education are less likely to pursue 




Hypothesis 7 (H7): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size and 
their propensity to diversify will be strengthened when there is a higher level of control 
concentration in the business groups. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size and 
their propensity to diversify through a new firm will be strengthened when there is a 
higher level of control concentration in the business groups. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size and 
their propensity to diversify will be weakened as institution develops. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 10 (H10): The positive relationship between controlling owners’ family size 




Hypothesis 11 (H11): The performance of business groups in emerging economies first 
decreases with the level of diversification, and then increases after the level of 
diversification crosses a threshold. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 12 (H12): Business groups will have better performance when the related 
diversification is pursued through a new division rather than a new firm. 
Yes 
  
Hypothesis 13 (H13): Business groups will have better performance when the unrelated 
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Figure 4: Diversifying Entrant in Hotel Industry by Rebar Group 
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Source: BGT directory and National Statistics (Taiwan) 
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Figure 8-1: Formosa Plastics Group Before 1980s 
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Figure 8-2: Formosa Plastics Group During 1980s 
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